The Oregon Commonwealth Federation: The Rise and Decline of a Reform Organization by Hopkins Herzig, Jill
uRJ.:GON 
OLLECTlON 
HN 
55 
.074 
Herzig. 
The Oregon Commonwealth 
Federation. 1963. 
( 
LIBWY OP. THE< 
UNWf:RS Irr O f4 
OROOON 
THE OREGON COMMONWEALTH FEDERATION: THE RISE 
AND DECLINE OF A REFORM ORGANIZATION 
by 
JILL HOPKINS HERZIG 
A THESIS 
Presented to the Department of History 
and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon 
in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts 
June 19.63 
VITA 
Jill Hopkins Herzig was born in Ell:~ns, West Virginia, on 
~!arch 14, 1938. She received a Bachelor of Arts degree from the 
University of Oregon in June, 19601 and has attended the Graduate 
School of the University of Oregon since September of that year. 
Her area of special interest is the history of the United States 
since 1900. 
APPROVED 
(Adviser~ Thesis) 
Earl Pomeroy 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
CHAPTER 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
V 
THE BIRTH OF THE OREGON COMMONWEALTH FEDERATION •• 
THE FIRST YEAR: TRIALS AND TESTS •••• • • • • • 
THE MIDDLE YEARS: SPOILS AND SUBVERSIVES. • • • • 
THE DECLINE OF THE OREGON COMMONWEALTH 
FEDERATION ••••••••••• • • • • • 
CONCLUSION • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
BIBLIOGRAPHY • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ••• 
APPENDIX 
A 
B 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Page 
l 
3 
19 
57 
92 
106 
120 
124 
127 
INTRODUCTION 
The history of the Oregon Commonwealth Federation is the story 
of t he rise and decline of a reform organization. This thesis is an 
att empt to discover why the OCF was formed, how it developed, and why 
i t suddenly declined. 
From 1936 to 1942 the OCF tried to unite Oregon liberals behind 
the New Deal in an effort to bring liberal policies to the state. In 
thi s ef fort to bring a chic~en to every pot, the OCF had a finger in 
almost every pie. Therefore, the history of the Commonwealth Federa-
t ion involves a number of other organizations. 
This study is organized into five chapters. Chapter one out-
l i nes the political situation in Oregon that led to the formation of 
the CCF and its first convention in the spring of 1937. Monroe Sweet-
land became executive secretary of the OCF at this convention and was 
t he organization's moving spirit until shortly before its decline. 
Chapter two ·covers the period from the first conve~tion through the 
election :i.n the fall of 1938. It deals with the problems the OCF 
faced in trying to gain the support of suspicious farm organizations 
and a divided labor movement for its first foray into the political 
a rena. 
Chapter three carries the OCF from late 1938 through the elections 
of 1940. During this· period the OCF was the chief supporter of the 
2 
national administration in the state and tried to gain control of the 
Oregon Democratic Party. This chapter also deals with the unsuccessful 
attempt of the Communist farty to take over the OCF. The further 
development and sudden decline of the Federation following the out-
break of the Second World War are handled in chapter four. The final 
chapt~r compares the Commonwealth Federation with left-wing movements 
in other states during these years and surveys the role it played in 
Oregon. 
This thesis is based primarily on the Papers of the Oregon 
Commonwealth Federation. The writer is indebted to Mr. Monroe Sweet-
land for permission to use this collection, which includes not only 
the minutes, publicity, and communications of the OCF, but a great 
deal of material on other organizations as well. 
CHAPTER I 
THE BIRTH OF THE OREGON COMMONWEALTH FEDERATION 
A few days after Franklin D. Roosevelt was re~eleeted president in 
1936, articles of incorporation were filed in Salem for an organization to 
be known as the Oregon Commonwealth Federation. The purpose of the new 
organization was 
the education of farmers, industrial workers and other workers 
relative to their econ~mic, social and political interest; to 
unite such persons in a political organization devoted to their 
economic and social interests; such political organization to 
·be committed to the principle of production for use •••• 1 
As a first step in fulfilling this purpose, the Oregon Commonwealth 
Federation sought to bring a New Deal to Oregon. Although Oregonians had 
twice overwhelmingly endorsed FDR at the polls, the supporters of his pro-
grams were not yet in control of the state's _polltical life. 
Oregonians may have thought they were bringing the New Deal to Oregon 
in 1934 when they elected Democrat Charles H. Martin governor. A retired 
army general and former Republican, Martin had been elected to Congress as 
an advocate of public power in 19.30 and campaigned as a supporter of the 
New Deal in 1934. It soon became apparent, however, that the General was 
1Articles of Incorporation of the Oregon Commonwealth Federation, 
November 5, 1936, Oregon Commonwealth Federation Papers (Oregon Collec~ 
tion, University of Oregon Library, Eugene). Manuscript sources cited 
in this thesis are in the OCF Papers unless otherwise indicated. 
4 
more sympathetic with big businessmen than with the underprivileged. By 
the end of his gubernatorial term he had broken with Roosevelt and vehemently 
attacked the administration's labor and hydroelectric policies.2 
The General, whose sobriquet was "Old Iron Pants," was as well known 
for his profanity and tactlessness as for his conservative policies. Martin 
regarded refugees from the Dust Bowl as "alien paupers," and his attitude 
toward recipients of relief was "Helli Let them work"--when there was no 
work. He advised the Grange's lobbyists at the state legislature to "get 
back to your fields where the birdies sing," and was sure that Oregonians 
were "just choked" with power when almost half of the state's farms were 
not electrified. On more than one occasion the General appeared to support 
vigilantism against strikers and was particularly famed for the remark: 
"The Italians wouldn't submit; they organized their Blackshirts. The 
Germans wouldn't submit, so they had their Brownshirts and Hitler. I 
don't believe Americans will submitsn3 
Despite the reactionary leadership of Governor Martin, the Oregon 
Democratic Party grew by leaps and bounds during the thirties. In Novem-
ber, 1932, the 319,840 registered Republican voters outnumbered Democrats 
more than 2 to 1. By -1936 the Republican registration had declined to 
288,791, while Democratic strength shot up to 247,J.4].. The trend continued, 
and by 1940, the Democrats were less than 6,000 behind. Presumably most 
2Portland Oregoniap, November 9, 1934, P• l; September 23, 1946, 
P• l ; February 2~, 1959, P• 5. 
3New York Times, May· 20, 1938, p.·18; Richard L. Neuberger, "Goon 
Squads -- Haltl" Collier's, CI (April 2, 1938), 24; Hearings before~ 
Committee .2!l Rivers fil!! Harbors, House g! Representatives, gn !!• li• ~ 
(Washington, 1937), 65. 
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of these new Democrats had been attracted to the party by Roosevelt rather 
than by "Old Iron Pants," but the rank and file were unorganized and the 
old-guard, Martin Democrats were in control of the party's councils.4 
If the New Deal were to come to Oregon, its supporters had to be 
organized behind common candidates and programs. This could not be accom-
plished immediately within the Democratic Party, tor the major sources of 
support for the New Deal's programs in Oregon were Republican tanners and 
Democratic laborers. 
Oregon's farmers shared the administration's commitment to public 
power. The largest fann organization in the state, the Oregon Grange, was 
also the state's most ardent advocate of rural electrification and of public 
develoµnent and distribution of hydroelectric power. The majority of 
farmers and Grange leaders seem to have been Republicans, but it had been 
progressive Republicans, such as George Joseph, Julius Meier, and Peter 
Zimmerman, who had led the fight against private power companies in Oregon. 
Some of the officials of the State Federation of Labor were also 
Republicans, but· the majority of rank-and-file unionists in Oregon were 
Democrats. In Oregon, as elsewhere, labor took on new vigor under the 
protection of the New Deal's legislation. In the early thirties Northwest 
lumber and mill workers flocked into the AFL unions in droves, and a wave 
of bitter strikes swept the area. These Depression recruits brought new 
militancy into the unions and were as passionately attached to the adminis-
tration that supported their right to organize as they were opposed to the 
Democratic governor who appeared eager to subvert this righte 
4oregon ~ Book, !m-~ P• 133; m7.-li2!, P• 194; !.9lt1-~ 
p. 243. 
/! 
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These two focal points of support for the New Deal suggested a 
political alliance of fanners and laborers. Such .an idea struck a respon-
sive chord among liberals who were convinced or the fundamental hannony of 
interest between producers in the factory and field, and it seemed to fit 
the national trend, for across the nation tanner-labor organizations were 
stirring with new life. The formula appeared particularly workable in 
Oregon where the State Federation of Labor and the Oregon Grange had main-
tained friendly relations for some years. It did not seem impossible that 
these two groups could be drawn still closer together, tor the distinction 
between farmers and laborers was ofteri blurred. Many lumber workers or 
fishermen lived in rural areas and worked a small fann on the side, and a 
good many Oregon farmers had at some time worked in the woods or in a 
sawmill, or at a trade.5 
Although the Oregon Commonwealth Federation was not tonned until 
late 1936, the idea f or such an organization grew out of the gubernatorial 
campaign of 1934. In that year Peter Zimmennan ran tor governor as an 
independent. The Grange maintained its traditional policy and did not 
endorse candidates, but Zimmerman, an officer or the State Grange and the 
only gubernatorial candidate supporting a Grange-sponsored power initiative, 
was understood to be the Grange's candidateo In August Zimmerman addressed 
the convention of the State Federation of Labor~ The Federation endorsed 
his candidacy and also instructed its executive committee to join with farm 
organizations and other progressives in building a. political party "separate 
5oregon ~range Bulletin September 5, 1934, P• l; Neuberger,~ 
Promised ~ New York, 1938~, 251-53. 
and distinct" from the two major parties for· the purpose of achieving 
collect ive ownership of the basic industries of the state.6 
7 
Zimmerman lost the election, but sentiment for a third party con-
tinued within the AFL. At the convention of the State Federation of Labor 
in 1935, proposals for the formation of a new political party gave rise to 
the hottest debate of the session. Three resolutions were presented on the 
subject , calling respectively for a labor party, a tanner-labor party, and 
a party based on the principle of production for use . The debate was 
settl ed with a compromise resolution which called upon the officers ot the 
organizati on t o co-operate with other groups in establishing a "new 
pol itical organization" to back "progressive candidates.n7 
The fol lowing year saw littl e progress toward this goal, but the 
convention of 1936 again instructed Ben Osborne and the other officers ot 
the State Federat i on of Labor to continue efforts to fonn a "third party." 
Shortly after the convention the AFL newspaper, the Or egon Labor Press, 
began carrying r ef erences to meetings held to organize a Port.land branch 
of a farmer-labor party sponsored by the AFL and "others.,.S 
In November some of the men promoting this fanner-labor party filed 
articles of incorporation for the Oregon Commonwealth Federation. Listed 
as officers of t~e new organization were Daniel D. Whedon, ·a member of a 
Portland AFL union, president; Roy R. Hewitt, Salem lawyer and f'onner Dean 
6oregon Labor Press, November 10, 1934, P• l; August 31, 1934, P• l ; 
Sept ember 7, 1934, P• l . 
7 . 
ill,g,. , August 23, 1935, P• 1. 
. . 
8Ibid., June 19, 1936, P• l; June 26, 1936, P• l; July 10, 1936, 
P• l ; August 28, 1936, P• l . 
of Willamette law school, vice-president; and Gail M. Bell of Portland, 
secretary. In addition to these men, the articles of incorporation were 
signed by Ben T. Osborne, executive secretary of the State Federation of 
Labor, and Dr. Albert Slaughter, a chiropractor and prominent Granger.9 
The plan of creating a third political party appears to have been 
discarded by November, tor the articles of incorporation refer only to 
endorsing candidates for public office. If the organizers of the OCF 
had not already abandoned the id!;3a of a third party, the reaffirmation 
8 
by the national convention of the AFL of its traditional disapproval of 
third-party action in early December, 1936, would probably have had that 
result ~s the organizers of the OCF depended on the AFL for support. At 
any rate, when the OCF revealed itself to the public the following spring, 
it was as a nonpartisan league of progressives.10 
Early in 1937 a committee began to plan for the first convention of 
t he Oregon Commonwealth Federation. Among the young men on this committee 
was twenty-seven year-old Monroe Sweetland, who was designated by the 
minutes as "organizer, OCF." Although born in Oregon, where his father 
was football coach at WiJJamette University, Sweetland received most of 
his education in the Midwest and East, where he plunged into lert-wi.ng 
politics and became ·a Socialist and field secretary for the League_ for 
Industrial Democracy. Roy Hewitt suggested Sweetland for the job of 
organizer for the OCF, and Sweetland, then a student at Willamette law 
9Articles of Incorporation of the OCF., November 5, 1936. 
lOoregon Labor Press, December 4, 1936, P• l. 
school, left to make the OCF his labor of love for the next five yeara.ll 
The committee asked Sweetland to prepare a draft of a call to the 
convention. In March Sweetland reported to the committee that the execu-
tive committee of the Federation had accepted Ben Osborne's substitute 
call, "which dealt less harshly with the Democratic Party" than had his 
own.12 It was apparently Osborne's call that was issued shortly there-
after over the names of the executive committee. 
9 
Addressed "To the People of Oregon" and calling them to a convention 
for "progressive political action" in Portland, April 24-25, 1937, the call 
disclosed "the need for united political action by the progressive forces 
of the· State." Reactionaries from both parties had combined in the state 
l egislature to check progressive legislation; the Democratic governor used 
his office to resist the progressive policies of the national administra-
tion; the courts were packed with "legalistic and reactionary j'>(iges"; and 
county and city officials used their power to "oppress the disposses~ed," 
to aid wealth, and deny civil rights. 
It is established that our natural resources and highly developed 
productive power make abundance possible and poverty no longer 
excusable. Yet organized special privilege ••• threatens our 
democratic institutions, violates our civil liberties, incites 
international war and domestic discord, and by its selfish poli-
cies keeps the great mass of the people in poverty and insecurity. 
In defense of human rights we must unite against this common menace. 
With our united force we must press on by every democratic means 
to secure the blessings _which this age of abundance might be made 
to provide tor us and our posterity.lJ 
llMonroe Sweetland to T. J. Larson, February 14, 1938; Reuben o. · 
Norman (ed.), Capitol's Who's !lh.2. ~ Oregop. ~-/ii {Portland, 1942), 
408. 
12Minutes of ·ocF Convention Committee, March 20, 1937 • 
. 
l3nA CALL to a convention for progressive political action." 
10 
To counter the forces of "special privilege" the OCF proposed to 
bring together the "liberal-minded" citize~ry who "comprise a preponderant 
~ajority" in a "powerful federation of all progressives ready to advance 
through democratic methods.11 So the call went out t,o: 
farm organizations and trade unions, to producers and consumers 
cooperatives, to youth and student and unemployed organizations, 
to religious and cultural societies, to pension and political 
clubs.14 . 
All of these were invited to select delegates to lay the foundation for 
progress in Oregon. 
Sweetland urged the committee to endeavor to get the call endorsed 
by "certain representative persons upstate," suggesting that this would 
0 eliminate much of the stigma which would be attached to a convention 
called and managed almost solely by the Portland Labor Groups.n15 Many 
of the endorsements were from labor leaders, but the call also carried 
the name of the most widely known and revered progressive leader in the 
state, Peter Zimmennan. Among the other endorsers were persons prominent 
in the Oregon Farmers' Union, the State Grange, and the Oregon Workers' 
Alli ance, as well as the inevitable handful. of liberal lawyers, ministers, 
and college professors. 
The new organization had the backing of the Portland labor groups, 
but the OCF also needed support from farmers. The membership of the Oregon 
Grange was the obvious source of this support, but the Grange had a prohi-
bition against political affiliation so it could not send official delegates 
14Ibid. (All capitals in original). 
I 
15Minutes of OCF Convention Committee, March 6, 1937. 
11 
to the convention, and G. W. Theissen, State Grange overseer, warned the 
commit tee that an approach to farmers through the Grange would spell 
"almost ce~ain death to the progressive leadership now on the spot in 
the organization." He suggested that the OCF could reach farmers through 
other organizations, such as Townsend clubs. Theissen and Zimmerman had 
endo~ed the call, but by early April, Theissen resigned from the conven-
t i on committee and both he and Zimmerman asked that their names be omitted 
from further literature put out by the committee.16 
The position of the Grange handicapped the search for a keynote 
speaker. The OCF convention committee hoped to avoid having a labor 
leader assume this prominent r ole and tried to find a well-known Oregon 
farmer t o gi ve the address. But in Oregon the most prominent liberal 
farmers were of f i cer s of the Grange, and the committee was unsuccessful. 
Lawyer Hewitt was finally selected, although the committee felt that his 
profession was a distinct liability for a libera1.17 
By the last meeting of the committee on April 21, the convention 
was well in line. A draft constitution ·had been prepared, rules for the 
convention drawn, 178 delegates already registered, and an agreement 
reached that the committee would recommend Monroe Sweetland for secretary 
of the convention and Dr. s. Stephenson Smith for permanent chairman. The 
committee also agreed that the OCF would be handed over to a new "mass 
base" at the convention and that there would be no effort. to control the 
deliberations of. the convention.18 
16~., March 27, 1937, and April 3, 1937. 
l?ill,g_., March 27, 1937, and April 10, 1937. 
18Ibid., April 21, 1937, April 10, 1937, and March 27, 1937. 
l2 
The first convention of the Oregon Commonwealth Federation opened at 
Harmony Hall in Portland with about three hundred and fifty people present. 
The bas'is of representation set forth in the call was essentially the same 
as that contemplated in the proposed constitution. Any organization in 
accord with the general purpose of the OCF could send two delegates if 
the organization had between ten and twenty-five members, an additional 
delegate for its next twenty-five members, and after that, one delegate 
for each succeeding fifty members up to a total of ten delegates.19 
The organizations that took up the ofter to join in a progressive 
political program ranged from the Rosebud Study Club to the Lumber and 
Sawmill Workers' Union. According to the report of the convention creden-
tials committee, labor was most heavily represented, with one hundred and 
eighty delegates. Pension groups and organizationsof the unemployed to-
gether sent seventy-five delegates, fann organizations fifteen, student 
and youth groups seven, and "miscellaneous groups" seventy-one. The 
delegates represented four central labor councils, fifty-six labor unions 
and auxiliaries, eleven pension groups, fifteen organizations of the 
unemployed, four Granges, six Fanners' Unions, seven student groups, and 
twenty-seven "miscellaneous" organizations.20 
The convention followed the advice of the convention committee and 
elected Stephenson Smith, professor of English at the University of Oregon, 
19Minutes of the first OCF Convention, April 24-25, 1937; "A CALL." 
2~utes of the first OCF Convention, April 24-25, 1937. The Grange's 
representatives presumably came under a special arrangement outlined in 
the call, which allowed ten or more members of any one fann organization 
to select delegates. Strictly speaking, the delegates did not represent 
the Grange. 
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as chairman of the convention, and president of the OCF as well. The 
forty year-old professor was a graduate of Reed College and had been its 
first Rhodes Scholar. He had political as well as academic qualifications, 
for during the twenties he had been active in the Farmer-Labor Party in 
the state of Washington. Byron G. Carney, Democratic state senator from 
Milwaukie, was elected first vice-president and A. C. Heyman, an Albany 
farmer active in the Farmers' Union, second vice-president. Harry Gross, 
a radical young Portland lawyer who was shortly to die of tuberculosis, 
was elected third vice-president and Sweetland was selected to be the 
executive secretary of ·the OCF. In addition to these officers, thirty-
three directors were named from the convention caucusing by interest 
groups-labor, fa.rm, youth, pension and unemployed, and "miscellaneous.1r21 
·Throughout the convention a great deal of emphasis was placed on 
the corrimon interests of labor and the scarcely-represented farmers. A 
member of the State Grange labor committee was on hand to address the 
convention on that topic, and the convention responded by pledging the 
absent farmers aid of every kind. The farm plank in the platform adopted 
by the convention pledged the OCF to work for security for farmer~ from 
eviction, for subsidies for co-operatives, and for the 
fostering of the organization of farmers into economic and 
political units, to the end that they may secure a measure 
of control over the marketing of their products through col-
lective bargaining and thereby obtain cost of production •••• 
21Jbid. Information on individuals has been culled in bits from 
a variety of sources. The Oregon Voter; the· Oregon grange Bulleti~, the 
Oregon Labor Press, the Labor Newdealer, and, of course, the <X;F Papers 
have been particularly useful. · 
Resolutions passed by the convention reiterated and supplemented these 
pledges. 22 
l4 
Probably of more interest to farmers was the dis9ussion of power from 
Bonneville Dam. The first plank in the OCF platform called for "[p)ublic 
ownership of all natural resources, utilities, banks, and monopolies." 
It went on to_ call for "publicly constructed transmission lines" to make 
power from Bonneville available throughout the state. This was the pur-
pose of the Grange's power bill for which Zimmerman had campaigned in 
1934. The plank also endorsed the creation of People's Utility Districts 
(PlJD's) and a uniform rate to distributing agencies for Bonneville power. 
These principles were embodied in a bill presented in Congress by Repre-
sentative Walter M. Pierce,. and the convention passed a resolution speci-
fically endorsing the Pierce bill. 
The Commonwealth platform went on to cover almost every other topic 
of contemporary interest. The OCF supported civil liberties and academic 
freedom, wage and hour legislation and legislation providing protection 
for consumers. It advocated a one-house legislature and limiting the 
power of judicial review by the Supreme Court. The platform also called 
for adequate public works, public housing, unemployment insurance, and 
old-age pensions, as well as free medical care for school children and 
families with low incomes. To finance all this the Federation called 
for a system of taxation based on the ability to pay, and expressed oppo-
sition to the sales tax. "Nothing," commented the Portland Oregonian, 
22Ibid.; Resolutions passed at the first OCF Convention. The Plat-
form adopted at the first OCF Convention is given in full in Appendix A. 
15 
"seems to have been overlooked by the platform makers in the way of public 
beneficence, munificence or magni.ficence.tt23 
In both their platform and resolutions the delegates expressed them-
selves on war. They opposed it. They also opposed militarism wherever 
it showed its head, home or foreign grown fascism, and war profits. They 
urged: 
the establishment of world peace by an embargo on all war mater-
ials, and on all raw materials used for war purposes to fascist 
aggressor nations and by cooperation with all democratic peoples 
for the defense of international democracy and peace.24 
The convention adopted the proposed constitution with little dis-
cussion except on Article X. This article provided that any official or 
affiliate guilty of supporting candidates or legislation contrary to OCF 
policy, or engaging in activity "designed to disrupt" the OCF, could be 
suspended by a two-thirds vote of the board of directors. The provision 
was vigorously assailed by the officials of the AFL who were unwilling to 
sacrifice labor's political autonomy to an organization which could con-
ceivably be dominated by nonunion groups.25 
The rest of the constitution provoked little discussion. It provided 
piannual conventions composed of delegates from each organization "-fllhich 
has subscribed officially to the minimum program of legislation as outlined 
in the platform and has affiliated with the OCF." An organization could 
affiliate by paying a one-dollar charter fee and monthly dues based upon 
23Portland pregoniap, April 27, 1937, P• 8. 
24p1atform of the OCF. 
25ocF Constitution and By-laws; Minutes of the first OCF Convention, 
April 24-25, 1937. 
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the size of its membership. Apparently payment of these fees was ample 
proof that the organization subscribed to the minimum program. Aside from 
possible contributions, dues and charter fees were the sole financial 
support of the OCF.26 
Hailing from afar the birth of this new organization were such left-
ist lights as Upton Sinclair, the Farmer-Labor Progressive Federation of 
Wisconsin, and the farmer-labor governor of ¥d.nnesota, Elmer Benson. Send-
ing greetings too, was the head of the Oregon Communist Party-although 
the minutes do not record that this telegram was read to the convention. 
On hand to play midwife in person was Howard Costigan, executive secretary 
of the Washington Commonwealth Federation (WCF).27 
The WCF, which Costigan had fashioned out of his earlier Common-
wealth Builders, gained control of the Washington Democratic Party in 
1936, and in the elections of that year Democratic-Commonwealth candidates 
met with phenomenal success. Although the WCE was originally an outburst 
of native radicalism, the Communist Party began infiltrating it after the 
party adopted the Popular Front policy in 1935, and by 1937 th~ party had 
gained control of the WCF. Costigan himself covertly joined the party, 
although he was to leave it a few years later.28 
26Affiliated organizations were assessed fifty cents per month for 
a membership between ten and twenty-five; one dollar for twenty-six to, 
hundred members; two dollars for one hundred to five hundred members; five 
dollars for five hundred to a thousand members; and one dollar per month 
additional for every five hundred members over one thousand. 
27Minutes of the first OCF Convention, April 24-25, 1937; Henry Rutz 
to OCF, April 20, 1937; James Murphy to OCF Convention, April 25, 1937. 
28A brief tteatment of the WCF can be found·in David J. Saposs, 
Communism in A.~erican Politics (Washington, 1960), 20-40. The investiga-
tions analyzed in Vern Countryman, Qn.-American Activities ~ ~ State 2f_ 
Washington; ~ ~ 2f ~ Canwell Committee (Ithaca, 1951), concerned 
-many of the members and activities of the ~F. 
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The OCF had no formal connection with the Washington Commonwealth 
Federation, and it is difficult to tell to what extent the planners or 
the OCF consciously modeled their organization after the Washington group. 
At the first OCF convention, two of its incorporators gave brief accounts 
of the genesis of the Federation. According to Daniel Whedon, the OCF 
was "patterned after the Washington Commonwealth when it was determined 
the original A.F. of L. farmer-labor committee needed to be broadened." 
But Ben Osborne, who was credited by all with furnishing the original 
impulse for farmer-labor political organization, said in his historical 
sketch: "We decided to follow the Minnesota program of tanner-labor 
organization." Mr. and Mrs. Wendell Barnett, who attended some of the 
early farmer-labor committee meetings, recall that the OCF was pat.terned 
af ter Canadian Commonwealth groups, and Roy Hewitt, one of the incorpora-
tors, attributes the OCF to a local impulse to alleviate the di~tress 
caused by the Depression and the realize the brotherhood of man through 
a co-operative group. The Washington Commonwealth Federation, he thought, 
had nothing to do with it.29 
Unanimity about the inspiration for such an organization is scarcely 
to be expected. But i:t, is obvious that the platform of the OCF, which 
the Oregonian attributed to Harry Gross, was drawn in large part from the 
platform of the Washington Commonwealth Federation and followed it ver-
batim in places. Much of the OCF constitution was also borrowed, including 
the disputed Article X. As Roy Hewitt said in his keynote address, 
29Mi.nutes of the first OCF Convention, April 24-25, 1937; Interview 
with Mr. and Mrs. Wendell Barnett, July 3, 1962, and with Mr. Roy R. 
Hewitt, August 2~ 1962. 
"[t]he urge that called this convention is not peculiar to Oregon •••• 
What we are doing here today has its counterpart in Minnesota, North 
Dakota, Washington, California and Canada.,JO 
.30Portland Oregonian, May 28, 1937, p. 4; See Appendix B·for the 
P).atform of the WCF; Keynote Address by Roy R. Hewitt. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE FIRST YEAR: TRIALS AND TESTS 
From the beginning some Oregonians saw the OCF as a distinct threat 
to the "American way of life." The Oregonian predicted that the Common-
wealth Federation would have a hard time convincing many people that it 
was "anything less than a menace from Moscow"; the prediction soon proved 
t o be correct. The Governor's secretary, W. L. Gosslin, was one of the 
f irst to detect the "menace," and he set about sharing his insight. 
Gosslin wrote to the Portland School Board informing them that a Franklin 
High School teacher, Miss Ruth Stone, had participated in a convention 
called by a branch of the Communist Party. The letter drew attention to 
the criticism of Governor Viartin contained in the call to the OCF conven-
tion, and asked what the board thought of the "propriety of public school 
teachers publicly attacking the executive head 0£ the state." Miss Stone 
denied she had "communistic leanings," and the School Board filed the 
letter without action. A similar attack was made· on Dr. Smith at the 
University of Oregon without serious effect.1 
Others did not see red so quickly, but as the election of 1938 
approached the "menace" of the Commonwealth Federation became obvious to 
1Portland Oregonian, May 28, 1937, p. 4; Salem Capital Journal, 
Viay 11, 1937, P• 7, and May 12, 1937, P• 3. 
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the editor of the Salem Capital Journal. The Journal charged that the 
first Commonwealth convention had been organized under the direction of 
the Corr.munist Party, and that Morris Rappaport of the Communist Party 
had selected the officers and framed the resolutions. The paper urged 
political candidates to repudiate the "Commonwealth-Communist endorse-
ment.n2 
The OCF, which had been watching the Salem paper since an earlier 
reference to the "Commonwealth-communists," denied the "clumsy libel." 
The Ca.J?ita.l Journal, said Monroe Sweetland, was using an "old device of 
the desperate" in shouting "Communist at the top of its wrathy voice." 
When a retraction was not forthcoming from the .Q.?,pital Journal, the OCF 
considered taking legal action but soon dropped the matter for lack of 
funds to pursue it successfully.3 
The accusations of the Salem paper probably did the OCF little harm 
among its potential adherents, for the Commonwealth could point to the 
contrary judgment of the conservative but responsible Portland Oregonian. 
The Oregoniap had little sympathy with the Federation, finding that 
"[s]ome of its advocacies are ••• impossible and others are fantastic." 
The Oregonian found that the OCF included "a few Communists" but also 
noted that the Commonwealth included most every other shade of "liberalism, 
2salem Capita1 Journal, October 20, 1938, P• 4. 
Jill£., May 10, 1938, p. 4; Statement by ¥.10nroe Sweetland, October 
19, 1938; Sweetland to George · Putnam, n.d.; "A Complaint in the Circuit 
Court, of the State of Oregon, for the County of Marion, Oregon Common-
wealth Federation, Plaintiff and Capital Journal Publishing Company, 
Defendant"; Minutes of the OCF Board of Directors, ·November 13, 1938. 
I 
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r~dicalism and discontent," and that there was no evidence that the 
Commonwealth was connected with the Communist Party.4 
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More serious to the future of the OCF than the allegations of the 
Capital Journal or the criticism of the Oregonian were assaults upon the 
new organization from within organized labor itself. At its first conven-
tion, the OCF looked like a potential political force. It appeared to have 
the support of the State Federation of Labor, and it did not seem altogether 
impossible to win the backing of a substantial number of farmers, particu-
larly members of the Grange, which was a traditional ally of the AFL. It 
soon became apparent, however, that even the AFL could not be taken for 
granted. 
Instead of affiliating with the OCF immediately after the first con-
vention, the Portland Central Labor Council decided to delay the matter for 
several weeks in order to give its affiliates time for discussion. Along 
with the notice of this decision, the council sent its affiliates copies 
of arguments for and against Article X of the_ OCF constitution. However, 
discussion of the Federation's constitution soon ·gave way to denunciation 
of the new organization in a pamphlet issued by Kelly Loe. Loe, who as 
editor of the Oregon Labor Press appeared to be the voice of the state 
leadership of the A.FL, complained that a Communist had been chairman of 
one of the important Commonwealth convention committees while outstanding 
liberals of the labor movement had been neglected. Ben Osborne's role as 
midwife for the OCF had been presumed to signify labor's acceptance of 
4Portland Oregonian. May 15, 1937, p. 8, and May 28, 1937, P• 4. 
the new organization, commented the Oregonian, but Loe's pamphlet had 
withdrawn the AFL's "blessing from the babe and ••• placed the infant, 
by implication at least, on the doorstep of the .cammunists."5 
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In June the State Federation of Labor convention advised unions 
affiliated with the .AFL not to join the Commonwealth, but the fundamental 
reason for rejecting the OCF was not specified until November, 1937. 
Osborne then wrote: "Commonwealth is only the back door to the CIO. So, 
A.F. of L. unions are being solicited to accept a semi-affiliation with 
CIO by joining the· Commonwealth."6 
The AFL's hostility to the OCF was due neither to the CCF's consti-
tution nor to the alleged presence of Communists. The hostility was 
caused by the break between the Committee for Industrial Organization and 
the American Federation of Labor. Ramifications of this break were felt 
strongly in the Northwest, and the CCF inevitably became involved in the 
controversy swirling around the CIO, for the OCF included a number of 
unions that cast their lots with John L. Lewis. 
The most important of these unions to the OCF and the one which 
was the immediate cause of labor warfare in Oregon was the Lumber and 
Sawmill Workers' Union. In 1934 the .AFL placed Northwest lumber unions 
under the jurisdiction of the Brotherhood. of Carpenters and Joiners. 
1-fany lumber workers were dissatisfied with the imposed leadership of the 
conservative Carpenters, particularly during the long lumber strike of 
5oregon Labor Press, · May 7; 1937, p. 1, and May l.4, 1937, P• l; 
Portland Oregonian, May 28, 1937, P• 4. 
6oregon Labor ~eM_, July 2, 1937, P• 2, and November 19, 19?7, 
p. 1. 
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1935. In 1936 the lumber workers began a flirtation with the CIO, and 
in July, 1937-: just a few months after the first CCF convention --
representative·s of the Lumber and Sawmill Workers' Union met in Portland. 
Here they took the name of International Woodworkers of America (IWA) and 
joined the cro.7 
that 
The Carpenters responded to this defection by instructing all locals 
our members must not handle any lumber or mill work manufactured 
by any operator who employs C.I.o •••• Let your watchword be 
"No c.r.o. lumber or mill work .in your district, 0 and let them 
know you mean it. 8 . 
The Carpenters did their best, and scarcely two years after the 
strike of 1935, Oregon and the Northwest were again in the grip of violent 
labor turmoil. This time the struggle was a three-ring circus between 
employers, the CIO, and the AFL, with Governor Martin ranting in the back-
ground~ In this struggle 0 Portland became the battleground upon which 
was fought one of the most bitter and involved controversies over juris-
diction that the labor movement has ever experiencect.09 
This intra-labor controversy obviously held dire peril for the 
new Comrnonwealth Federation, which depended upon united labor backing 
as the beachhead from which to gain ground among other progressive groups. 
It could turn to no other comparable base of support; farm groups were 
7vernon H. Jensen,~£~ Labor (New York, 1945), chso 9-11. 
8carpenter's circular of August 11, 1937, in Walter Galenson, 
The 91.Q Challen£;~ ~-~ fil; P:_ Histor,y of ~ American Labor Movement, 
12.12,-19~1 (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), 387. . 
9Jensen, ~.EEfilE. Labor, 215. Both Galenson and Jensen discuss 
the labor warfare and the character of the IWA. ' 
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cautious, almost cold, and beside labor and a few farmers the first OCF 
convention had attracted only a motley assortment of study clubs and rival 
pension groups. In order to pursue even these prospects, the Federation 
needed money, and for this labor unions were the most promising source. 
The leaders of the OCF were also committed emotionally and theoretically 
to the cause of the working class. For both ideological and practical 
reasons the Commonwealth needed united support from labor, but this 
support was dissolving, and labor's warfare threatened to alienate the 
middle-class and farm support which the OCF also required. 
The OCF attempted to meet the crisis by standing above the storm 
and deploring its existence. Commonwealth officials tirelessly called 
for unity in labor and denounced disorder. Despite the attacks of the 
AFL hierarchy upon the OCF, ten members of AFL unions served on the OCF's 
board of directors and persistently appealed to their AF'L brethren to 
join the Commonwealth. It was imperative, they believed, that labor be 
united politically desp:i,te "minortt disagreements. Pointing out that 
labor's disunity played into the hands of labor haters like Governor 
Martin, these OCF members urged unaffiliated AFL locals to send "fraternal" 
delegates to the convention of the OCF in December, 1937, which would 
shape plans for the political campaign of 1938.10 
While calling for unity in labor, the OCF attempted to minimize 
labor's responsibility for the strife by emphasizing the role of "reac-
tionary public officials" who blew up the "so-called fight in the ranks 
of labor for the purpose of 'cutting wages and discrediting labor." The 
10
statement of·· the OCF on Labor Disorder, n.d.; Ruth Stone and 
others to AFL locals, December 7, 1937. 
25 
OCF believed that support of the National Labor Relations Board's decisions 
by public officials would do much to reduce the tension, and they had good 
reason to think that this support was missing. In October the NLRB found 
majorities favorable tp the CIO in six major Portland mills. Governor 
Martin announced in December that he was dissatisfied with the result of 
the election in one of these mills and would conduct his own election. 
Explaining his action to a Senate committee several years later, Martin 
said: 
I was told by the employers in the Poulsen mill, which is the 
bi ggest mill ••• that a decided majority of that mill was 
A.F. of L •••• I said, "I am not going to call an election 
here u.~less I know that you have a majority, because I want 
this election to be a cinch. I don't want to get licked. I 
want this thing to go A.F. of L." • .•• I made those fellows--
I had to wait 2 -weeks to bring me the cards that the A.F. of L. 
would carry that election, and at last they produced them. 
The IWA carried the election, and that, !l...artin complained, had "spoiled 
the whole business.n11 
The CCF demanded that public officials cease interfering in labor's 
choice of bargaining agent and that they protect rival labor organiza-
tions from each other. In September, Stephenson Smith wrote to the 
Portland City Council demanding protection for Portland workers from the 
"reign of terroristic violence" which bad been imposed on them because 
of their choice of labor organization. When Mayor Joseph Carson protested 
that there was no reign of terror, Monroe Sweetland compiled a list of 
llResolutions passed at the second OCF Convention, December, 18-19 
1937; National Labor Relations~~ Proposed ~endments, Hearings 
before~ Committee on Education~ Labor, United States Senate_ 76 
Cong., 1st-3rd Sess. "twashington, 1939), 1481-82. 
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twenty-seven acts of violence which had come to his attention in the 
previous two weeks. In most of the incidents CIO trucks had been dumped, 
or CIO tugboats bombarded from Portland_bridges with bullets, bottles, or 
boulders.12 
Although the OCF's pleas for unity in labor, support of the NLRB, 
and an end to violence seem both reasonable and innocuous, the leadership 
of the AFL did not find them so. Unity, even on the political front, 
implied recognizing the vigor of the CIO. The AFL found this untenable, 
and the State Federation of Labor convention of 1938 declared that 
"A.F. of L. unions cannot compromise with c.r.o. or enter into joint 
action with it, either in industry or politics.u13 
Nor was the AFL enthusiastic about the NLRB, which they maintained 
was biased in favor of the CIO. In urging law enforcement, the OCF was 
also stepping on the AFL9 s toes. All of the violence during this period 
was certainly not perpetrated by members of AFL unions, and the officials 
of the State/ Federation of Labor deplored violence. But a "goon squad" 
of Dave Beck's teamsters seems to have been responsible for much of the 
violence, and the teamsters were in the AFL.14 
It would have been almost impossible to find a more neutral position 
in the turmoil than the one taken by the OCF; yet the AFL continued to 
12s. Stephenson Smith to the Portland City Council, September 9, . 
1937; Sweetland to 1'1ayor Joseph K. Carson, September 18, 1937. 
l311The Position of the Oregon State Federation of Labor on the 
Commonwealth Federation," June 23, 1938. 
14Jense~, Lumber filE_ Labor, 216-17; Neuberger;~ Promised Land, 
212-14. 
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attack the Commonwealth. In 1938 -- an election year -- the convention 
of the State Federation of Labor passed a strong recommendation against 
A.FL locals affiliating or allying with the Commonwealth "on its general 
program or in support of or opposition to any candidate or measure." 
Noting that Harry Bridges had admitted that the Oregon and Washington 
Commonwealth Federations were "organ~zations similar to the Lewis Non-
Partisan League," the convention went on to declare the OCF a "political 
fungus growth" that menaced good government; the AFL would "resist its 
penetration into the political affairs of the state.nl5 
Some A.r"i.. locals and union members ignored such pronouncements, but 
these attacks hurt the Commonwealth. It is impossible to tell from the 
OCF files just how many AFL unions did affiliate with the OCF; however, 
·a list of organizations represented at the OCF convention of May, 1938, 
includes only three AFL locals and only one is listed for the fall conven-
tion.16 
A few members of AFL unions worked as individuals in the OCF despite 
attacks upon them in the Oregon Labor Press and harassment within their 
unions. s. P. Stevens, president of Local 43 of the International Asso-
ciation of Firefighters, had been selected by the Portland Central Labor 
Council as a delegate to the first OCF convention and was elected to the 
OCF board of directors at that time. In August, 1937, another member of 
1511The Position of the Oregon State Federation of Labor on the 
Commonwealth Federation," June 23, 1938. 
16official delegates list, third OCF Convention, May 7, 1938; 
List of delegates registered for the fourth OCF Convention, October 16, 
1938. The OCF kept some kind of a file of its affiliates, but this is 
not in the OCF Papers. 
' 
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Local 43 requested that Stevens be tried for espousing the cause of the 
CIO, associating with radicals and Communists, and defending the Oregon 
Commonwealth Federation. Stevens apparently withstood the onslaught, for 
he continued as president of Local 43. The young secretary of the Retail 
Clerks local in Eugene, however, was suspended from his office because 
of his activities in the OCF. He reported that the business agent of the 
local said they were ~icking Commonwealth sympathizers out as fast as 
they could catch up with them, because the "0.C.F. was 'the back door 
to the cro.,n17 
To support his accusation that the OCF was essentially a CIO front, 
Osborne cited the fact that six of the Commonwealth directors were active · 
in the CIO. He neglected to mention that even more were members of AFL 
·unions. These he dismissed with the remark that those "who still retain 
their membership in A.F. of L. unions, are boring from within in ,the 
interests of C.I.0." There is no evidence that these persons were 
"boring from within," but they apparently were more concerned than was 
Osborne about a divided and politically impotent labor movement.18 
While the Commonwealth's leaders genuinely deplored disunity in 
labor and were eager to have the support of the AFL, it does seem to 
have been true that the sympathy of the majority of them was with the 
CIO. This is hardly surprising, for there were many young people in the 
group as well as a few former Wobblies, several Socialists, and an occa-
17A. J. Dooney to Local 43, International Association of Fire-
fighters,August 9, 1937; Charles Paddock, Jr. to Heinie [Esterly], 
January 8, 1938. 
18pregon Labor Press, November 191 1937, P• 1. 
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sional Communist sympathizer. The group shared a common disaffection from 
the st atus quo -- and in the labor movement, the AFL represented the 
status~· Even had there not been this sympathetic response to the 
CIO, the antagonism of the AFL to both new organizations would have made 
the CIO and the OCF natural allies. And allies they became. 
October l, 1937, saw the first edition of the Labor Newdealer, a 
weekly newspaper edited by Bob Wilmot, who was a member of the Co~.mon-
wealth board of directors. The _pa.per was sponsored by the Portland Unity 
Council, which purported to consist of both AFL and CIO unions interested 
in preventing a split in the labor movement. In fact, the Council seems 
to have been a halfway house for unions moving into the CIO, and the 
sympa.thies of the Council were reflected in its paper. The Labor~-
dealer consistently lambasted the policies and officials of the AFL, and 
pursued Kelly Loe with particular relish. Week after week the Newdealer 
carried a column which featured such tidbits as: 
Kelly had a little herring 
Its scales he painted red, 
And now in place of argument 
He waves that fish instead.19 
News of both the CIO and the OCF, on the other hand, received 
solicitous attention. Monroe Sweetland issued press releases on the 
slightest provocation, and these appeared regularly in the Newdealer 
if nowhere else. When the Labor Unity Council gave way to the frankly 
CIO Portland Industrial Union Council, the Labor Newdealer continued the 
same editorial policies as the organ of the new council.20 
191abor Newdealer, particularly October 1, 1937, and October 22, 
1937. Nost issues of the Labor Newdealer can be found in the library 
of the Oregon Historical Society in Portland. 
20ib~£•, December 24, 1937. 
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The bond between the OCF and CIO was strengthened by the estab-
lishment of an infonnal working relationship between the OCF and Labor's 
Non-Partisan League. The League had been established u,nder the leader-
ship of John L. Lewis before the suspension of the CIO unions from the 
AFL in the fall of 1936. After this its AFL members gradually dropped 
out, and the League became the political arm of the CIO. The purpose of 
the League was to promote legislation favorable to labor through fanner-
labor political co-operation, and the League signed a political pact with 
the National Fanners' Union in the fall of 1937. The League also urged 
strong precinct organization and support of the New Dea1.21 
Shortly after the first OCF convention, Stephenson Smith began to 
explore t he possibility of having the Commonwealth Federation designated 
as a "kind of holding company" for the League in Oregon so that a rival 
organization would not be established in the state. In October, E. L. 
Oliver, executive secretary of the League, conferred with the leaders of 
t he OCF during a brief visit to Portland. A few weeks later the OCF 
began receiving installments of a loan from the League to be used for 
organizational work in agricultural areas.22 
Far more important to the OCF than the financial aid from the 
League was the contact with Washington, D.C., that Oliver's office pro-
vided. The OCF was in no position to maintain a representative in 
21Pamphlet, Labor's Non-Partisan League, Its Origin~ Growth 
(19.39); Labor's Non-Partisan League, Organizing .Letters, particularly 
no. 14, September 15, 1939. - The Oregon Labor Pre~~ carried new releases 
from the League during 1936, but in 19J8·William Green publicly condemned 
the League. Crego~ Labor Press, April 8, 1938, p. l. 
22Smith to Sweetland, June l, 1937; Sweetland to E. L. Oliver, 
November 2, 1937. 
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Washington; yet to make its limited weight felt it needed to know what 
was going on behind the scenes in the capital. In addition to providing 
this kind of information, the League encouraged the leaders of the OCF 
in their desire to develop precinct organizations. Much of what limited 
success the OCF enjoyed can be attributed to these factors -- contacts 
in Washington and precinct organization. 
Intra-labor conflict severely handicapped the OCF's attempts to 
carry out its various promises to the working class, but it went to bat 
for labor where it could. One of the planks in the platform called for 
an adequate program of low-cost public housing, and in the fall of 1937 
the Federation began a major effort to have a Public Housing Authority 
established in Portland. In September President Roosevelt signed the 
Wagner-Steagall Act, and immediately a Portland Committee on Rents and 
Housing appeared which included persons concerned with housing conditions 
from church, labor, women's, and minority organizations. The Portland 
Committee had no formal connection with the OCF, but it was obviously a 
broader version of a previous housing committee of the OCF, which had now 
assumed an independent character in order that "the hostility of the 
Mayor and Governor to ••• the Federation would not injure the housing 
program." The chairman and secretary of the OCF committee became chairman 
and secretary of the new committee, and Sweetland was also active in the 
new group.23 
The Portland Committee became a thorn in the side of · the City 
23sweetland to Herman Kehrli, October 9, 1937. 
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Council and the real estate interests. In October it secured a hearing 
before the Council which resulted in the Council appointing a committee 
of experts to investigate Portland housing conditions. Four months later 
the experts reported in favor of creating a Housing Authority, but the 
Council did nothing about the report for another four months and in June, 
1938, passed the buck to the voters by placing the matter on the ballot 
for the election in November, although the Council itself was empowered 
under Oregon law to establish a housing authority.24 
In addition to the labor situation, the leaders of the OCF had 
other problems during the organization's first year. On the day follow-
ing the first convention of the OCF, G. W. Ward, a leader in the pension 
movement, wrote to Monroe Sweetland. Ward was disturbed by the "notice-
able fact that farm representatives were conspicuous by their absence" 
from the convention. He was not alone in his concern.25 
Leaders of the Commonwealth tried in two ways to improve the rela-
tionship between their organization and farmers; one method involved a 
major political issue, while the other less dramatic approach involved 
the slow work of gaining contacts and organizing for the Federation in 
farming districts. Both approaches involved dealings with the two chief 
24william L. Brunner, "The Development of Federal Public Housing 
Policies and the Housing Authority of Portland, Oregon," unpublished 
B.A. thesis (Reed College , 1948), deals with attempts from 1937 to 1941 
to get a Public Housing Authority in Portland, but does not mention the 
OCF. On the role of the OCF see: Sweetland to Bob [possibly columnist 
Robert S. Allen], October 21, 1938; H. M. Esterly, Sr. · to Smith, March 
15, 1938; Oregon Commonwealth Housing Program by Smith, n.d. [fall, 1937]; 
Portland Committee on Rents and Housing, Agenda, Housing Hearing, October 
18, 1937. 
25G. H. Ward to OCF, April 26, 1937. 
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farm organizations in qregon -- the powerful State Grange and the Farmers' 
Union. 
The Grange was by far the larger of the two organizations. In 1937 
it claimed a membership of 21,000 with units in every part of the state. 
Throughout this period of turmoil in labor the leadership of the Grange 
was undoubtedly sympathetic to its organization's old ally, the AFL, 
and hence cautious in regard to the Commonwealth Federation. Even had 
this not been so, the leaders of the Grange would have been inhibited 
from an open alliance with the OCF both by the Grange's prohibition against 
partisan political activity and by periodic threats from more conservative 
Grangers. As the alliance between the CIO and the CCF developed, some 
Grangers became openly hostile to the OCF, but many leaders of the Common-
wealth were members of the Grange, and the OCF had good friends in such 
prominent Grangers as Dr. Albert Slaughter, Dr. C.H. Bailey, editor of 
the Gr ange Bulletin, and Morton Tompkins, Overseer of the State Grange. 
Although not openly friendly, State Grange ¥~ster Ray Gill was quite 
willing to work with the OCF on projects of common concern. Gill consis-
tently defended the traditional Grange policy of co-operating with labor, 
and rejected efforts to have the farmers pull "the chestnuts out of the 
fire for large corporation employers." He was wary of the radical labor 
leaders who emerged during the rapid unionization of the thirties, but 
expressed confidence that responsible leadership would develop as the 
new unionists gained experience.26 
26oregon Grapge Bulletin, Februa·ry 24, 1937, p. 12; July 5, 1937, 
p. 2; March 20, 1938, p. 11; Sweetland to A. C. Heyman, September 20, 
1937. Sweetland, Smith, Hewitt, Heyman, Neuberger, and Dr. J. F. Hosch 
were among the leaders of the OCF who were also members of the Grange. 
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In contrast to the Grange, the Farmers' Union was mainly confined 
to western Oregon, and most of its 2600 member families were in the 
northern Willamette Valley. The National Farmers' Union had close ties 
with the CIO, and a few of the OCF's more radical members were also 
members of the Farmers' Union. But the leadership of the Oregon Farmers' 
Union was cautious about getting too chummy with labor, or with the 
friends of labor in the OCF.27 
In November, 1937, the CCF, with the aid of seventy-five dollars 
from Labor's Non-Partisan League, sent former missionary and State 
Senator Byron G. Carney on a month's tour of the Willamette Valley to 
carry the good news of the Commonwealth Federation to farmers. Carney 
seemed to have no trouble finding groups with which to talk, but whatever 
gains the tour made for the OCF were certainly not immediate. Only nine-
teen representatives from fourteen farm organizations -- five Granges, 
six Farmers' Unions, and three co-operatives -- attended the second 
convention of the OCF in December.28 
When the OCF encountered the lukewarm attitude of the Farmers' 
Union officials and the Grange's prohibition against direct affiliation, 
they hit upon the expedient of setting up OCF Clubs to enroll farmers 
and other interested parties. These clubs paid dues and were represented 
at conventions on the same basis as other affiliates of the Federation. 
Although the OCF claimed a score of such clubs, this writer has found 
270regon Farmer, June 10, 1937, p. · 6; Charles E. Nelson to Sweet-
land, June JO, 1937; Sweetland to Heyman, May 25, 1937. 
28Labor Newdealer, November 12, 1937; Mailing list of delegates 
to the second OCF Convention, December 18-19, 1937. 
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mention of but half that number, and even these seem to have been active 
only sporadically.29 
The Commonwealth was dedicated not only to winning the friendship 
of farmers, but also to fostering political co-operation between farmers 
and labor. Progress was slow, and there was danger that Governor Martin's 
inflammatory statements would strike a responsive chord with enough 
farmers to destroy even the meager result of the OCFts work. A remark 
the Governor made in Grants Pass was not unique.· There he was reported 
to have said, " I hope the good old American farmer will reach for his 
pitchfork" if labor should attempt to disrupt the harvest.JO 
In response to this remark an OCF farm committee composed of members 
of the Farmers' Union and Grange rushed off a letter to the Portland 
Central Labor Council. The letter was written to "d~sassociate Oregon 
farmers • • • (from Martin's] un-American attempt to foment class warfare, 
and to incite force and violence." It concluded with the characteristic 
Commonwealth touch: ttour only security against reaction lies in cooperation 
and joint action in the political field.u3l 
In February, 1938, there was trouble at a market in Portland when 
some "farmers" attempted to deliver potatoes. According to the "farmers," 
union men insisted on unloading the potatoes and a scuffle ensued for 
29sweetland to Harry W. Laidler, December 11, 1937. 
30salem Capital Journal, May 26, 1937, p. 11. 
} 1Heyman and others to Phil Brady, May 26, 1937. 
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which the "farmers" conveniently were armed with pitchforks. The Governor 
hastily offered to send state police to maintain order. This time the 
farm-labor relations committee of the State Grange responded. The 
committee investigated the incident and reported that the "farmers" 
admitted that they were not delivering their own potatoes but were operat-
ing a truck for hire; that they had telephoned photographers on their way 
to Portland to ~rarn them there would be trouble; that they had attempted 
t o start a fight; and that they had received a letter from Governor . 
Martin congratulating them for their efforts. Although the "farmers" 
later denied this report~ the committee stuck to its conclusion that the 
incident was "prearranged." Needless to say, the OCF was delighted with 
the committee's report.32 
Setting up OCF Clubs and denouncing the Governor were relatively 
ineffectual in achieving the ends of the OGF, but the Commonwealth held 
more powerful bait with which to lure farmers, particularly Grangers, into 
co-operation if not affiliation. The lure was the OCF's stand for public 
power, which~ happily, also appealed to labor and middle- class progres-
sives. 
The specific issue in 1937 was the use to be made of hydroelectric 
power from Bonneville Dam on the Columbia River. Al.though the dam had 
been under construction for four years and was scheduled to begin opera-
tion in late 1937, by the spring of 1937 Congress had not yet made any 
provision for marketing the power. 
32Portland Crego!! Journal, Febr-aary 4, 1938; p. 17; Salem Capital 
Journal, February 5, p. 2; Oregon Grange Bulletin, February 20, 1938, 
p. 14. 
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In Oregon there were but two sides to the debate. Partisans on 
one side included Governor ~J.artin and other leading Democrats, private 
power companies, and the Portland Chamber of Commerce. This group main-
tained that the people were "just choked" with electricity and that 
consequently industry was the only possible market for the power. To 
attract the necessary industry, Bonneville must offer it thelowest 
possible rates -- large blocks of power should be available at the dam 
site for a rate which would cover only the cost of generating the power. 
The cost of tran&~itting power from the dam should be borne by users of 
that power in proportion to their distance from the dam. As Walter 
Pierce noted, along with attracting industry to the Columbia Gorge, this 
plan would keep Bonneville power from interfering with the high rates of 
private power companies in Portland and elsewhere. 
The most vocal opponents of this plan included the Grange, organized 
labor, the OCF, and Walter Pierce. With rhetori~ reminiscent of Popu-
list days, this group harangued against the evils of Wall Street capital-
ists who wished to monopolize another great natural resource so that they 
could continue to bilk the public with exorbitant rates. Professor 
Smith succinctly 81pressed their attitude: "We don't want the big boys 
to grease their snouts in the trough until the common people have had 
first chance at th~_ cheapest power in the world. ,t33 
33Smith to tillian Herstein, June 1, 1937. Spokesmen for both 
sides of the controversy present their cases in Hearings before~ 
Committee 2.!l Rivers §:.1}.g_ Harbors, House of Representatives, .2!1 g. g. 
7..f2!:d (Washington, 1937), 75 Cong., 1st Sess., and in Conference on 
~ Distribution of Bonneville Power, printed in the University 2£ 
Oregon Commonwealth Service Series (Eugene, 1937) , II, no. 4. The 
controversy is summarized by Neuberger in the Portland Orego~ian, 
38 
The OCF and its allies heartily endorsed FDR's plan for federal 
power projects to serve as "yardsticks" of fair power costs, forcing 
down the rates of private companies. This purpose could be achieved 
only if the power were available to as many people as possible at the 
lowest possible rate. To insure this result the group urged state or 
federal construction of major transmission lines, blanket rates over 
large areas, preference for public agencies in distribution of the power, 
and reservation of 50 per cent of the power for several years to give 
public-power districts ti.me to organize. 
For Walter Pierce, public-power development was the most pressing 
issue of the day. When not preparing a speech on the subject for the 
Congressional Record~ he was busy entreating his Oregon friends, includ-
ing the officers of the Commonwealth, to forsake side issues and give 
their all for public power. In the Seventy- fifth Congress Pierce intro-
duced a bill incorporating his views on the marketing of Bonneville power. 
Hearings were held on the subject in·late spring, 1937, and after 
Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes endorsed the principles of the 
Pierce bill, it was reported out of the House Rivers and Harbors Commit-
tee with only minor changes.34 
Throughout the spring of 1937 Oregon Granges sent resolutions to 
Washington in support of "Brothern Pierce's stand on Bonneville. By the 
September 26, 1937, mag. sec., 13, and February 16, 1938, III, 6. 
Most issues of the Oregon Grange Bulletin during the thi:rties refer· 
to the power issue. Walter· Pierce-expressed himself frequentl y in 
the Congressional Record, 75 Cong., 1st Sess . 
34Pierce to Smith, June 25, 1937. 
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end of May the Commonwealth Federation entered the act and arranged 
nsave Bonneville" meetings wherever sponsors could be found -- Astoria, 
st. Helens, McMinnville, Milwaukie, Salem, Eugene, Bend, Klamath Falls. 
These meetings served as a platform for OCF speakers, passed appropriate 
resolutions on Bonneville, provided a convenient opportunity to sign up 
members for the OCF and organize OCF Clubs.35 
In connection with the "Save Bonneville" meetings, the OCF organized 
a "Bonneville Caravan." To this all-day picnic near the dam progressives 
from farm and factory were invited to hear how the "Insulls of Oregon, 
with their Martins, their Carsons and their Corbetts and other stooges 
in high places, have been fightL~g for their 'right' to grab still more 
gravy and graft from the people of Or~gon." In spite of a steady down-
pour some two hundred people showed up to view the "new Bridge of the 
Gods" and hear the message -- including a long one from Secretary 
Ickes.36 
In August President Roosevelt signed the- Bonneville legislation. 
Although the legislation embodied all the principles for which the 
advocates of public power had been fighting, the application of these 
principles depended upon a sympathetic administrator. J. D. Ross, former 
35r11ustrative of resolutions sent to Pierce are those from 
Sheridan Pomona Grange, April 23, 1937, and Harding Grange No. 122, 
June 13, 1937, Walter M. Pierce Papers (Oregon Collection, University 
of Oregon Library, Eugene); Oregon Commonwealth Federation News, 
n.d. [June, 1937]. 
36Flyer, "Join the Bonneville Caravan"; unsigned letter ·from OCF 
to Piere~, June 23, 1937; Harry Slattery to Smith, June 11, 1937, with 
attached statement of Harold Ickes. 
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administrator of the Seattle municipal power system and vice-president 
of the American Public Ownership League, was thought to be a likely can-
didate for the post. Governor Martin took the lead in attacking the 
candidacy of Ross and called a meeting at the Multnomah Hotel to organ-
ize the anti-Ross forces. The OCF promptly had one of its members, Assem-
blyman· Dr. J. F. Hosch, call a meeting of the leading advocates of 
public power at the same hotel, and although Hosch invited only nine 
or ten people, the Grapge Bulletin reports that nearly three hundred 
showed up. On the motion of Stephenson Smith this meeting organized 
the People's Power League, with Hosch as chairman, to campaign for the 
appointment of Ross. 
The OCF had been planning a picnic in late August and hastily 
turned over the picnic date and site to the new League for its organi-
zational rally. Over a thousand people attended the rally, which passed 
resolutions urging the appointment of Ross and the immediate formation 
of People 9 s Utility Districts, and elected permanent officers. The CCF 
had endorsed a slate of officers for the major positions in the People's 
Power League, and the whole slate was successfully elected.37 
When President Roosevelt made a brief visit to Oregon in late 
September, the opposing factions seized the occasion to gain his atten-
tion for their claims for or against Ross. The OCF mustered a crowd, 
reported to number three thousand, armed with posters to greet the 
37oregon Grange Bulletin, January 20, 1938, p. 2; Minutes of the 
OCF Executive Committee, August 14, 1937; Minutes of the OCF Board of 
Directors, August 28, 1937; Report of .the executive secretary to the 
OCF Board of Directors, August 28, 1937; Sweetland to Will Puustinen, 
August JO, 1937 •. 
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President at the west end of the Ross Island Bridge in Portland. The 
previous evening the public-power forces, under the disguise of the 
"Plain People of Oregon Reception Committee," had held a rally to welcome 
the President and urge the appointment of Ross. As Oregon's leading 
Democrat, Martin had an opportunity to gain the President's ear, but 
to no avail. At Bonneville the Governor sat dourly by while Roosevelt 
dedicated power from the dam for use in ho.~es and on farms, and a few 
weeks later the President appointed Ross.38 
The battle of Bonneville was not finished with the appointment of 
Ross; it had only been joined. The battlefield now shifted from Washing-
ton, D. c.,to the counties where atte~pts were made to form People's 
Utility Districts. On this field the battle outlasted the OCF. 
Although the public-power people all appeared to be working toward 
the same goal~ feuds rent the movement. Conflict apparently revolved 
around the question of leadership and grew out of distrust caused by 
divergent views on the issue of labor. J. L. Steinback, a director of 
the first PUD in Oregon, wrote to Sweetland in June, 1937, complaining 
of the lack of co-operation among the advocates of public power: 
Whenever I sit in with some of you fellows you are cussing 
[Albert] Streiff, [Herman] Lafky, Theissen and others of that 
group as anti-Labor and whenever I run into some one from 
that crowd I hear that you guys are a bunch of Communists. 
"Now how in hell," asked Steinback, "are we ever going to win this fight 
if this is allowed to go on?tt39 
381abor Newdealer, October 1, 1937; Flyer, "Welcome the President"; 
Portland Oregonian, September 28, 1937, p. l, and October 11, 1937, p. l. 
39J. L. Steinback to Sweetland, June 17, 1937. 
.. 
.. 
Mrs. Grace Charlton, wife of a Tillamook doctor, also wondered. 
She complained that "the sum total of work done is to foster a sorry 
mess of petty rivalry," and warned Sweetland that the CCF could expect 
little co-operation from Herman Lafky and other Grangers, as "I under-
stand that they have decided your group is communistic.u40 
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Discord broke out in the ranks of the People's Power League a few 
weeks after it was formed. The original incorporators of the League 
included, in addition to Hosch, AFL officials Ben Osborne and George 
McDonald; Herman Lafky, an attorney from Salem who numbered the AFL 
among his clients; Sam Brown, a Gervais farmer active in the Farmers' 
Union; Charles Thomas, former state Utility Commissioner; and A. M. 
Church~ editor of the Salem Capital Press. The majority of this group 
refused to accept the election of the "liberal" officers at the rally 
in August. This particular row apparently was settled, for the People's 
Power League operated during the following winter. In January, 1938, 
Hosch announced his candidacy for the governorship and resigned as 
president of the League. Yet early in April the League's board of 
directors suddenly ousted Hosch as president and George M. Clevenger as 
treasurer, citing the unauthorized publication of a pamphlet attacking 
the stand of the Oregon Voter on public power. According to the direc-
tors, the League had not authorized any such publication, which they 
40Grace M. Charlton to Sweetland, June 1, 1937. 
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said came from "the Hosch crowd" -- that is, from the Commonwealth crowd.41 
It is not .surprising that only one new PUD was formed in Oregon 
during 1938.42 The prestige of being associated with a victorious cause 
would have greatly enhanced the position of the OCF, but aside from 
reducing the likelihood of victory, the dissension within the power 
ranks probably did not hurt the OCF too much. The feud was sufficiently 
veiled that probably few people beyond those directly involved were aware 
of it. At any rate it received little publicity in the daily press or 
in the Grange or labor papers. However, the OCF gained from the public-
power oovement publicity that associated it with the position of the 
thoroughly respectable Oregon State Grange. 
From the beginning of the OCF both its critics and its supporters 
looked forward to the elections of 1938 as the first real test of the 
Commonwealth's mettle. As 1937 drew to a close, the OCF's prospects 
looked dim; it had not realized its anticipated support from ei ther 
farmers or laborers. Nevertheless, the leaders were eager to enter the 
fray and trained for the campaign by attacking Governor Martin at every 
opportunity. The Governor was to be the Commonwealth's greatest asset, 
for unity against a common foe was much easier to achieve than unity on 
a positive program. 
41nr. J. F. Hosch to Sweetland, September 16, 1937, October 14., 1937, 
and October 19, 1937; Hosch to the Directors of the People's Power League, 
January 29, 1938; Portland Oregon Journal, April 1, 1938, p. 1. Lafky 
and Brown were reported to be in sympathy with the Associated Farmers, 
Madie Lippe to Sweetland, February 18, 1938. Church and Clevenger were 
members of the OCF. 
42Eleventh Annual Report of~ Hydroelectric Commission £1. pregon, 
f£.!: ~ Period Jul:t: 1, 12£ !& June .1Q, J:.2g, P• 26. 
In December 1937, the OCF announced that the battle to defeat 
Governor Nartin was on, and pledged itself to "re.move forever from public 
office the man who has ridden rough- shod over the rights of every citizen 
who is not his crony in the Chamber of Commerce." To open the campaign 
they imported Minnesota's farmer-labor governor, Elmer Benson, to show 
Oregonians what a "Real Governor" was like.43 
Having opened the campaign, the OCF stood in some need of a candi-
date. In late January Dr. Hosch announced his candidacy for the gover-
norship on the Democratic ticket. The prospect for Hosch looked bright, 
and the OCF's leaders were delighted. Sweetland was sure Hosch could 
get support from the rank and file of the AFL and began setting up 
political committees in AFL locals to circumvent the state leadership 
if necessary. However, on the last day for filing, Hosch withdrew in 
favor of young Henry L. Hess of LaGrande. Hess was an acthie 1liberal 
state senator and frequently appeared at public-power programs. During 
the previous summer the CCF and labor groups had backed him unsuccess-
fully for a position as a federal judge.44 
In addition to Yiartin, the OCF was particularly unhappy with the 
incumbent in the first Congressional district, Representative James A. 
Mott. The OCFts strategists thought Byron G. Carney would be a strong 
progressive candidate on the Democratic ticket, but in the last minute 
shuffle at the end of the filing period, both Carney and another pro-
43Flyer, "Can Governor Martin be Defeated?"; Labor Newdealer, 
December 3, 1937. 
44sweetland to Oliver, January 31, 193[8]1 and May 2, 1938; 
Sweetland to Hewitt, June 16, 1937. 
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gressive withdrew, an~ with them went any real hope for unseating Mott.45 
Outside of northwestern Oregon, where it was strongest, the Co~mon-
wealth did little to encourage progressives to run for the state legis-
lature or for local office. In Columbia and Clatsop counties the OCF 
made a successful attempt to bring representative persons together frore 
the Grange, Farmers' Union, AFL,·and CIO. This group formed a political 
strategy committee and sought out candidates behind whom all progressives 
could unite. Here the CIO and Ar""'I, worked together, for the Astoria 
Central Labor Council officers agreed with the CIO men that "[w]e should 
forget our union fight and unite on the political front.u46 
The OCF also made an effort during the primary campaign to get New 
Deal Democrats to run for precinct committee positions. Sweetland wrote 
to one prospect that tt[i]t is apparent ••• that many precincts in the 
County have neither a cor!lJTlittea~an or coillIT'itteewoman at the present time. 
The set-up is wide open for the OCF to move in." This effort was of 
minor proportions in 1938, but it did foreshadow a later technique of 
the OCF.4? 
Of more significance at the t:i.rne was the effort to get the member-
ship of affiliated organizations registered to vote. Sweetland had the 
membership of Portland IWA Local. 3 checked against the lists of voters 
45sweetland to Oliver, ¥1.a.y 2, 1938. 
4~,ra.x Gardner to Sweetland, February 13, 1938; Sweetland to Pearl 
Becker, March 17, 1938; Manley Wilson to Sweetland, ¥..arch 31, 1938;_ 
Gardner to Sweetland, n.d. 
47sweetland to V.trs. Selby, February 14, 1938. 
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and was appalled to find that only 36 per cent of the 3851 members were 
registered. Other unions were checked, and all but one very small union 
had less than 50 per cent of their membership registered to vote. After 
making this discovery in the Portland area, Sweetland urged CIO locals 
as well as AFL locals to set up political committees to get union members 
registered. By letter, postcard, flyer, and news bulletin, Sweetland 
pounded away with the message "To Vote Against Governor Hartin in the 
May 20th Primary, you must be Registered Democraticin48 
Two weeks before the primary election, the OCF held its third con-
vention, which was devoted to endorsing candidates for state and district · 
offices. By this time few of the endorsements were in doubt. The Common-
wealth was officially nonpartisan, but the convention endorsed no Repub-
licans. The OCF unanimously favored Senator Hess for governor over their 
archenemy, Governor Martin, and a candidate with a euphonious name but 
erratic views, o. Henry Oleen. ~.artin retaliated by calling the OCF 
conference a "convention of 250 nuts.n49 
Willis ~1a.honey, who had given Senator Charles McNary a scare in 
1936, was endorsed by the Commonwealth to try for Oregon's other seat· 
in the Senate, and the two incumbent Democratic representatives, Walter 
M. Pierce and Mrs. Nan Wood Honeyman, also received backing from the 
OCF. Among the other candidates endorsed were Mrs. Emily Edson for 
48sweetland to Oliver, March 5, 1938; to Elmer D. West, February 
11, 1938; to Hale Bankson, January 19, 1938; Postcard sent by OCF, 
April 11, 1938. 
49~unutes of. the th:i.:rd OCF Convention, May 7, 1938; Portland 
Qregonian, May 13, 1938, P• 3. 
secretary of sta.te and., of course., the OCF' s own Roy Hewitt for Supreme 
Court position number two. The delegates concluded the convention with 
a resolution to build a bigger and better OCF and went home. 50 
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Shortly before the state convention, conferences of Commonwealth 
affiliates had been held in Multnomah, Clackamas, Washington, Clatsop., 
and Columbia counties to endorse local candidates, particularly for the 
state legislature. Along with a good many ardent Commonwealthers, the 
Multnomah County conference endorsed s. Eugene Allen, president of the 
AFL Office Employees' Union, and Phil Brady, president of the Portland 
Central Labor Council. Both of these men were bitter critics of the 
Commonwealth., and Sweetland explained this action as a "gesture of good-
will toward the Labor Temple which makes the way easier for our forces 
in the A.F. of L., and makes the anti-CCF campaign of the die- hards 
corrur,ensurately more difficult.n5l 
The position of the AFL in the campaign was somewhat an1biguous. 
For Supreme Court position nUwber two., the State Federation of Labor's 
executive board endorsed the eighty-six year- old incumbent for another 
six-year term. ~fnen the board's endorsements were made public the Salem 
Trades and Labor Council endorsed Roy Hewitt for the position and 
requested that the board reconsider its endorsa~ent of the incumbent. 
Ben Osborne answered this request with a letter to all AFL unions 
50Minutes of the third OCF Convention., Nay 7, 1938. 
5l~tinutes of Multnomah County Conference, Hay l, 1938; Minutes of 
Clacka~as County Progressive Political Conference., April 2, 1938; OCF 
to Progressive Groups in Washington County, n.d.; Wilson to Sweetland., 
March 31, 1938; Sweetland to Oliver., May 2, 1933. 
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repeating his charge that the Commonwealth was a CIO front and pointing 
out that Hewitt had the support of the OCF and was active in that organ-
ization. Yet the Portland Central Labor Council, while attacking some 
candidates for their connections with the OCF, endorsed others with 
equally close ties, including a candidate who is said to have been 
endorsed by the OCF for the sole purpose of defeating a prominent A."l<'L 
candidate with a very similar name.52 
Despite qualms about candidates wlth the backing of the OCF, the 
AFL endorsed Hess, and Sweetland reported with a faint slur at the AFL's 
political saVV'.t !J that they were working as energetically "as they know 
how-' for the election of Hess. In fact, the AFL had no other choice. 
naving decided that "[p]olitically and socially ••• [Hartin] is a 
Neanderthal man, S\<r.i.nging a club at any who dares to disagree with him," 
the AFL could hardly avoid concluding that the "only way to eliminate 
Martin in the primary is by supporting Senator Hess.n53 
The Governor campaigned for re-election as a New Dealer. About all 
he could say in support of this claim was that "he rode all day with the 
President and that Jim Farley wrote hL~ a letter," but the claim bothered 
Hess's supporters. Sweetland fired off a telegr@n to Thomas Corcoran 
entreating him to get Ickes or Senator George Norris to endorse Hess. 
Five days before the election Norris wired that although he and his 
friends had once thought Hartin to be a true liberal, the Governor had 
52
oregon Labor Press, April 15, 1938, p. 3, and May 6, 1938, 
p. l; Barnett Interview. 
53sweetland to Oliver, May 2, 1938; Oregon Labor Press, April 15, 
1938, p. 1. 
uctisappointed all those hopes.tt Ickes produced a long letter to Hess 
which conciuded with the statement that "Martin is at heart no New 
Dealer. n54 
The Commonwealth's efforts int~ gubernatorial race apparently 
paid divide~ds, for Hess defeated Martin in the Democratic primary by 
but a slim seven thousand votes o"f the one hundred and twenty thousand 
cast .. Hess carried the northwestern Oregon counties where the OCF was 
Clatsop, Columbia, Washington, Clacka~as, Tillamook, and 
49 
strongest 
Multnomah as well as a scattering of other counties, such as Douglas, 
for which the Commonwealth could take little credit. Few of the other 
candidates endorsed by the OCF had serious competition in the primariJ, 
although Roy Hev.ri.tt was eliminated from the race for the Supreme Court.55 
As the general election approached the OCF forces were engaged not 
only in campaigning for successful liberal candidates but also in fight-
ing an initiative measure. The measure, which purported to be a bill 
"to protect the employee, the e.'11.ployer and the public in case of labor 
controversies," was sponsored by the Associated Farmers, Incorporated --
a front for reactionary business interests -- and the Oregon Farm Bureau, 
the Eastern Oregon Wheat League, and the Hood River Growers Club. Despite 
its innocent- sounding title, the measure was obviously aimed at making 
effective labor organization impossible. Among its offensive clauses 
was one that declared it unlawful for unions to collect funds in excess 
54speech by Elton Watkins over KGW, April 27, 1938; Sweetland to 
Thomas G. Corcoran, Hay 12, 1938; George W. Norris t o Henry L Hess, 
Hay 15, 1938; Harold Ickes to Hess, May 14, 1938. 
55oregon Blue Book, 12,39- 1940, PP• 200-201. 
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of their "legitimate requirements" without specifying what requirements 
were legiti."nate, and another clause declared it unlawful "by direct or 
indirect means to prevent, hinder or molest" a person seeking work from 
any employer. 56 
Although there was strong doubt that the measure would be upheld 
by the courts if it passed, the OCF and all organized labor vigorously 
assailed both the measure and its sponsors .. "In conception, in construc-
tion and in sponsorship it presents a structure of deceit which has not 
been previously· equalecttt declared the State Federation of Labor. Both 
gubernatorial candidates, Hess and Charles Sprague, condem1ed the 
measure, as did the Oregonian., and labor arbitrator Wayne L. Morse took 
to the radio to oppose it.57 
The sponsors of the initiative sea~ed to suffeT no shortage of 
funds for their campaign. They made frequent use of radio and flooded 
the state with pamphlets which in red, white, and blue told of the concern 
of "us farmers" to protect "true American unionism" from the clutches of 
"foreign labor dictators." One of Sweetland's contacts in Warrenton 
reported that all box holders on her mail route received these pamphlets. 
56on the Associated Farmers., which originated in California, see 
Clarke A. Cha~bers, California Farm Organizations;~ Historical Stu~ 
of the Gra!}_ge, the~ Bureau and the Associated Farmers, 1929- 19~1 
"[Berkeley, 1952),chs. 5, 6, 8. The initiative measure is printed in 
full in "An Expose of the Anti- Labor Bill," by the executive board of 
the State Federation of Labor. 
57New York Times, November 8, 1938, p. 18; Portland Oregonian, 
November 7, 1938, p. 6; Radio address by Wayne L. Morse, KEX, November 
4, 1938, given in full in Appendix B of Anne Golding, "The Oregon Anti-
Picketing Act," unpµblished B.A. thesis (Reed College, 1941). Miss 
Golding deals .with the background of the measure and follows it through 
the legal proceedings which resulted in the Oregon Supreme Court declar-
ing the entire measure unconstitutional in October, 1940. 
"For ~poor farmers'," she wrote, "it is remarkable where they can scrape 
up so much money for their campaign purposes% Probably had a good crop 
of ttaters' -- or something ••• •" OCF funds were so limited that the 
organization could do little to counter the barrage but add the advice 
uvote initiative 317 -- NO!" on whatever literature it put out.58 
51 
- As the summer passed, the OCF encountered other political problems. 
The Corr~~onwealth stuck with Henry Hess in his contest with Republican 
Charles A. Sprague, although they attributed Hess's victory in the pri-
~ary to Martin's unpopularity rather than to the excellence of his own 
campc:igno Even during th~ primary -campaign Sweetland had complained of the 
incorr.petence with which the Hess campaign was run. It lacked "able poli-
tical generalship," he thought, but since the abler "generalsn were all 
too radical, too closely identified with the Commonwealth, or eliminated 
by the Hatch Act, no changes were made. Throughout the ca~paign the OCF 
continued to receive complaints: Hess's people didn't get leaflets to 
the farmers or posters distributed; his camp was afraid of its shadow; 
Hess didn't hit the issues, Hess didn't truce to heart warnings of weak 
areas.59 
Mahoney also worried the leaders of the OCF who thought he showed 
a deplorable lack of interest in the rest of the ticket. Nan Wood 
58sweetland to Roberts. Allen, September 30, 1938; Flyer, nshall 
Foreign Labor Dictators and Racketeers Dominate and Control Oregon Labor, 
Agriculture and Industry'?"; Blanche Pickering to Sweetland, September 20, 
1938. 
59sweetland to Corco;an, June 6, 1938; Nathalie Panek to Sweetland, 
October 8, 1938; Gardner to Sweetland, n.d.; Sweetland to Oliver, Octo-
ber 15, 1938. 
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Honeynan was in trouble, and there was further difficulty with the AF1. 60 
In June the OCF had backed the successful candidate for chairman 
of the Multnomah County Dem.ocratic Central Committee. Although the new 
chairman was not closely identified with the CCF, the growing strength 
of the Commonwealth in the Committee roused the ire of the AFL. In July 
it became necessary for the Committee to appoint a candidate for the 
state legislature, and a spokesman for the AFL warned in a radio address 
that selection of a person close to the OCF might forfeit the AFLts 
support of the Democratic ticket in November. 61 
' 
Roy Hewitt, a former student of psychologist E. Stanley Hall, thought 
he knew what these attacks meant -- Osborne and Kelly Loe were looking 
for an excuse to slide into support of Sprague. To counter or discredit 
the anticipated move, Hewitt took his "good friend" Osborne to task in 
a bitter and public exchange of letters.62 
Why, Hewitt wrote, did Osborne attack him when it had been Osborne 
who had recruited him for the OCF and they had served together for a 
time on the executive board? Possibly Osborne had become the tpol of 
"concentrated wealth and vested interests?" Osborne's reply was that 
the Commonwealth was "dominated, or strongly influenced by, the Cornrnu.,,"llst 
Party, as was evident from the .first convention of OCF." To this Hewitt 
60sweetland to C_orcoran, June 6, 1938. 
61 
-Portland Oregon Journal, June 17, 1938, p. 15; Ruth Stone to 
Hewitt, June 25, 1938; Oregon Labor Press, June 17, 1938, p. l; Portland 
Oregonian, August 24, 1938, P• J. 
62Hewitt to OCF, August 24, 1938. 
retorted: 
I have investiaged [sic] the present program of the Oregon 
Commonwealth Federation, and I find it still building on the 
foundation and living up to the standards that you and I had 
a part in defining. You how oppose these principles and 
declare them communistic.63 
The exchange proved pointless and rather tragic, for Hewitt's 
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"good friend" Osborne died suddenly in early September. However, Hewitt 
had prophesied correctly the drift in the AFL. When the State Federation 
of Labor's endorsements carr£ out in September, . neither Hess nor ~.rs. 
Honeyman was endorsed, but both they and their opponents were commended. 
The AFL's leaders took this approach, according to Sweetland, because 
they "didn't have the brass to come out openly for their reactionary 
Republican opponents." At first Sweetland thought Mrs. Honeyman could 
¼~n without the AFL's endorsement, but soon he was writing columnist 
Roberts. Allen that she was his major concern, as the AFL was giving 
her opponent, Homer Angell, all the support it could.64 
"What a tornado that was! and what a lot of 'refuse' it blew into 
office," exclaimed a luckless OCF-endorsed candidate the day after the 
election. Surveying the results of the election, the Commonwealth found 
that the major candidates whom it had most actively backed -- Hess, 
Mahoney, and Mrs. Honeyman - had all been defeated. Hess lost by 
63Hewi.tt to Ben-Osborne, August 24, 1938; Osborne to Hewitt, August 
29, 1938; Hewitt to Osborne, August 30, 1938; Portland Orego~, Septem-
ber 1, 1938, p. 11. 
64oregon Labor Press, September 9, 1938, p. l, and September 16, 
1938, p. l; Sweetland to Oliver, September 13, 1938; Sweetland to Allen, 
September 30, 1938. Neither Sprague nor Angell looked so ureactionary" 
to Sweetland after the election. 
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fifty-six thousand votes, ~..a.honey by thirty-five thousand, but Mrs. Honey-
man by less than three thousand. All had done poorly even in areas where 
the CCF was strongest. Walter Pierce had been comfortably re-elected in 
his sagebrush district, but with no help from the Commonwealth. Worse 
yet, the antilabor initiative had passed by a substantial margin, and 
the OCF-backed Public Housing Authority had gone down to defeat in 
Portland. 65 
Monroe Sweetland gluirJ.y assessed the election as a "terrific 
schellacing [sic]tt for the Commonwealth Federation. The OCF certainly 
had failed in its aim of uniting fanners and laborers and leading them 
in triumph down progressive paths. But the Commonwealth was not in 
control of the causes of the defeat. The return to their regular party 
of Republicans who had voted for Martin in 1934, the defection of many 
conservative Democrats to the Republicans, and warfare in labor seem to 
have been'the chief reasons for the Democratic defeat. The OCF may have 
been partly responsible for giving the warfare in labor a political cast, 
but at the same tirne it had undoubtedly mustered many votes from the new 
CIO unions. The antilabor measure was a foolish but not entirely unde-
served retribution for disorder in the ranks of labor, and the OCF could 
not eliminate the cause of the disorder. Defections from the Democratic 
ranks were probably encouraged by the identification of the Commonwealth 
and CIO with leading Democratic candidates, but had the OCF forces not 
united behind a liberal candidate in the Democratic _primary Martin might 
65Pickering to Sweetland, November 10, 1938; OregS?Q Blue~, 
1939-19~1, pp. 202-203, 209; Portland pregonian, November 9, 1938# p. 1. 
well have won the election and possibly the general election as well. 
rt was certainly better for the OCF to be defeated by Sprague than by 
t . 66 !v.:ar in. 
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For an organization of persons convinced of the immediate need --
for some, the immediate pe~sonal need -- of adequate pensions, unemploy-
ment compensation, relief, lower power bills, protection of civil rights, 
and the right to freely join a labor union, the defeat was thoroughly 
galling. Yet, viewed from a long-range perspective, there were some 
elements of hope for the OCF in the political picture. 
Although only 20 per cent of the OCF-endorsed candidates had been· 
elected in the general election, 70 per cent of the OCF-endorsed candi-
' 
dates had been successful in the primary. 67 Some of these, _such as 
l~honey, Pierce, and Mrs. Honeyman, accepted the OCF' s backing, but they 
had made their political reputations before the Commonwealth appeared on 
the scene, and owed little of their success to its endorsement. However, 
there were lesser lmown candidates, many of them younger people, who 
were more immediately involved with the OCF, and a number of these had 
also been successful in the Democratic primary. It would take several 
years for these newer politicians to build the wide reputations necessary 
for competition for state-wide offices, but their success in the Demo-
66sweetland to Henry Rutz, December 22, 1938; New York Times, 
November 6, 1938, p. 41, and November 8, 1938, p. 18. 
67sweetland to Rutz, December 22, 1938. Sweetland gives these 
percentages, which agree with the writer's calculations. However, it 
should be remembered that the OCF did not endorse a candidate for every 
state-wide office, and endorsed candidates for the state legislature 
only in districts in northwestern Oregon. 
cratic prirr~ri~s in some of the most populous counties of the state, 
combined with the growing Democratic registration, augured a brighter 
future for the Commonwealth and its friends. The defeat of Governor 
Martin in the primary was hopeful, too, not only because it removed his 
platform for attacking the Commonwealth Federation, but because it 
opened the possibility of ousting his lieutenants from control of the 
Democratic Party to make way for persons more sympathetic to the New 
Deal. The OCF had already started to work toward this goal. 
56 
CHAPI'ER III 
THE MIDDLE YEARS: SPOILS AND SUBVERSIVES 
The OCF lost no ti.me licking its political wounds after the 
debacle in November, but i.Ir.mediately re-entered the political arena. 
Early in 1939 political interest in O~egon centered on the biennial 
legislative session in Salem where Sweetland and Byron Carney estab-
lished themselves as the OCF's legislative committee. 
The Federation's lobby found Governor Spraguets inaugural 
address more liberal than they had expected, and they decided to assume 
an attitude of watchful waiting for the performance of his program. 
Predictably, the OCF grew increasingly dissatisfied with the Republican 
governor as the elections of 1940 drew near, but relations between Sprague 
and the Commonwealth never deteriorated to the rabid name calling of the 
previous administration. The leaders of the OCF viewed Sprague as an 
"honest conservative" and were heartened by his staunch support of 
civil libertie~.1 
After Martin's defeat the literature put out by the CCF began to 
tame down. This may have been due to the change in the governorship, or 
1Labor Newdealer, January 13, 1939; Excerpts from address by 
Sweetland before CIO Convention, February 11, 1940; Radio address by 
Sweetland, KEW, January 18, 1941. 
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to the responsibility imposed by even a slight measure of success, or 
simply to a greater acquaintance with the opposition. There were still 
references to "reactionary labor-haters," "vested interests," and "con-
centrated wealth," but now the standard leftist vocabulary was sprinkled 
with recognition that members of the opposition might be sincere --
although obviously misguided. 
The OCF had too few friends in the legislature of 1939 to hope for 
any positive gains from it. The Commonwealth's lobby kept busy, however, 
simply fighting steps backward such as attempts to outlaw the closed 
shop, to exclude aliens from the practice of certain professions, and 
to increase the income tax in the lower brackets. Such "victories" as 
t he OCF could claim were simply playing a part in defeating some of these 
backward steps and occasionally having OCF-backed bills do better than 
in previous sessions. For instance, the Commonwealth went to bat for a 
bill forbidding discrimination against racial minorities in public places. 
The bill passed the Senate but failed in the Assembly. This was progress, 
Sweetland thought, for it was the first time such a bill had passed 
either house.2 
On one of the big fights of the session - and one of particular 
importance to the Commonwealth's political future -- the OCF and its 
allies were defeated by a narrow margin. The bill in question moved 
the date of the primary election from May to September, eliminated the 
- - - ------
2The OCF considered nine of the sixty representatives and five of 
the thirty senators as "notably progressive." Sweetland to Roger Bald-
win, February 20, 1939; News release, n.d.; Sweetland to Lucille B. 
Milner, July 1, 1939. 
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uresidential primary, _and provided that delegates to the national conven-
. 
tions be picked by the state party conunittees.3 
There are some good arguments for shortening the campaign period 
between the primary and general elections, but the opponents of the bills 
believed that in Oregon in 1939, these arguments simply concealed the 
~ain issue. The crux of the matter, they thought, was the question of 
a third terrn for Roosevelt. There was little doubt that Roosevelt could 
carry the Oregon Democratic presidential primary in 1940, but the state 
Democratic committee was still controlled by li!artin Democrats who were 
opposed to Roosevelt. 
Leaders in labor, the Grange, and the CCF were convinced that the 
change in the date of the primary was also aimed at reducing the progres-
sive vote in state elections. In Sept~nber many farmers would probably 
oe too busy to vote, and thousands of farm laborers would be away from 
their polling places, working in the harYest. Further, the shorter 
campaign period seemed to favor candidates with money for air trans-
portation and for radio and newspaper advertising. Progressive forces 
suffered from a chronic lack of funds, and with a short period for 
campaigning it W'Ould be impossible to continue t o rely on voluntary 
committees and a personal appearance by candi dates at every crossroad 
community hall.4 . 
A similar law changing the primary date had been defeated in a 
3p9use Calendar1 Fortieth Legislative Session of Oregon, 1939, p. 119. 
4sweetland to Milner, July 1, 1939; Radio address by Sweetland, 
Ma.y 21, 1939; Pierce to Sweetland, March 20, 1939; Oregon Grange Bulletin, 
March 20, 1939, p. 1. · 
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referendu~ in 1936 by more than a two-to-one vote, but despite this por-
tent and the threats of the opponents of the bill to file referendum 
petitions to suspend operation of the law during the elections of 1940, 
the bill carried. The GCF's legislative committee immediately issued a · 
press release which promised that the OCF would join other opponents of 
the measure in a campaign to secure the necessary signatures for a 
referen~~~- When the petitions came out, however, only the State Fed-
eration of Labor and the State Grange were listed on them as sponsors. 
The omission of the Commonwealth, Sweetland explained to the convention 
of the OCF in April, 1939, was necessary because the AFL threatened to 
'Withdraw its support if the Commonwealth appeared as a sponsor.5 
Nevertheless, the OCF supported the drive. Working closely with 
the Grange, the CIO, and a few AFL locals, the OCF set up county corrmit-
tees to organize the campaign. Referendum petitions required 16,969 
signatures in 1939. By the middle of June the sponsors had filed 26,000 
signatures. Of these the Grange secured 15,000,the OCF 10,000, and the 
AFL but 1,000. Sweetland attributed the small contribution of the AFL 
not to sabatoge but simply to the fact "that they have no enthusiasm or 
mechanics for political action. 06 
The campaign against the law changing the date of the primary was 
widely interpreted as the first skirmish in the campaign of 1940. The 
5oregon Blue Book, 19;9-1940, p. 209; OCF Legislative Committee to 
Representatives, March?, 1939; Press release, n.d. [March 9 or 10, 1939]; 
Portland Oregon Journal, April 16, 1939, P• 13. · 
/ 
0 sweetland to Ralph Peters, May 17, 1939, and similar letter to 
chairmen of OCF petition committees in Lane, Marion, Linn, Yamhill, and 
Coos counties, same date; Press release, n.d. [mid-June, 1939]; Sweetland 
to R. L. Burgess, June 2, 1939. 
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OCF encouraged this interpretation, particularly after the petitions had 
been successfully completed, and Sweetland took particular care that the 
meaning of the campaign and the Commonwealth's part in it were understood 
in the national administration.7 
The Commonwealth Federation worked closely with the Grange against 
the new primary law and for public power. In addition to co-operating 
with the Grange on these emotion-charged issues, the CCF increasingly 
ciµ.tivated farmers on a piecemeal basis by offering other small services. 
Illustrative of this growlng concern with the problems of small groups 
of farmers was the effort on behalf of loganberry growers. 
Sweetland attended meetings with indefatigable zeal. At a Farmers' 
Union meeting in May, 1940, he learned that a bumper loganberry crop 
threatened growers vrith disastrously low prices. Sweetland immediately 
began urging the Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation to place logan-
berries on its seasonal surplus list so that part of the crop could be 
absorbed under the Food Stamp Plan. With the co-operation of Senator 
McNary, the$e entreaties were successful, and arrangements were made . 
for the purchase of 1,500 tons of loganberries in· Oregon and Washington.8 
Sweetland hoped that such Commonwealth efforts on behalf of farmers 
would receive publicity in the gra™ Bulletin as an example of the 
benefits of farmer-labor co-operation. Although the stories did not 
7Portland Oregonian, ~pril 2, 1939, p. 6; Sweetland to Burgess, 
April 6, 1939; to· James Rowe, April 18, 1939; to Corcoran, June 16, .1939; 
to Lowell Mellett, June 16, 1939. 
8sweetland to Milo Perkins, June 1, 1940; E. w. Gaumnitz to Sweet-
land, June 20, 1940; Charles L. McNary to Sweetland, June 21, 1940. 
r 
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receive much publicity, the Commonwealth enjoyed an increasingly cordial 
relationship with Dr. C.H. Bailey, editor of the Grange Bulletin. The 
OCF plied Dr. Bailey with congratulations on his liberal stands and invi-
tations to attend OCF affairs. Although these .. efforts seldom bore fruit 
in direct mention of the OCF in the Grange Bulletin, Dr. Bailey did 
consistently support the position of labor -- and of the CIO -- on state 
and national issues of the day.9 
From its establishment the OCF had operated as an informal speakers' 
bureau for many organizations. In 1939 it attempted to reach more farmers 
by formally establishing a speakers service for Granges and Farmers' 
Unions. These organizations were offered qualified speakers on current 
topics -- the power issue, migratory labor, the legislature of 1939, 
the labor controversy. A number of Granges took advantage of this offer, 
but the proP<?sal got little response from Farmers' Unions, alt~ough the 
relationship between the Commonwealth and the Union appeared to be some-
what improved. The Yamhill County Farmers' Union selected delegates to 
the OCF's convention of April, 1939, and in January, 1940, Sweetland was 
invited to speak to the annual convention of the Linn County organization. 
Sweetland was also cultivating members of the national executive committee 
of the Farmers' Union and exchanging cordial letters with the president of 
the Oregon Union, who, however, remained noncommittai.10 
9sweetland to Dr. C.H. Bailey, September 27, 1939; Ruth Stone to 
Bailey, June 15, 1938; Sweetland to Bailey, April 6, 1939, and January 11, 
1940. 
10sweetland to Lecturers, August 22, 1939; · Don Kern to OCF, September 
8, 1939; Sweetland to C. A. Schooling, April 12, 1939; to Oliver, January 
15, 1940; to Morris Erickson, December 26, 1939; to Harley Libby, November 
28, 1939; Libby .to Sweetland, n.d. 
1 
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The Commonwealth Federation continued to be deeply involved in the 
field of public power during 1939 and 1940. J. D. Ross died suddenly in 
March, 1939, and the advocates of public power again began a campaign for 
a sympathetic administrator. R. A. Banks, chief engineer on the Grand 
Coulee project, was appointed temporary administrator for Bonneville, and 
as he was reportedly cool to both public power and CIO organizing on 
federal projects, the OCF was eager to keep his appointment from becoming 
permanent. The OCF and some leaders in the Grange soon settled on Robert 
W. Beck, a former Oregon boy and one of J. D~ Ross's assistants, as the 
most suitable candidate. But their hopes for Beck were soon squelched, 
for in May Banks, on orders from Ickes, fired him. for insubordination.11 
After ~i.ay the OCF seems to have dropped out of the effort to influ-
ence the appointment of a Bonneville administrator, despite speculation 
that the dismissal of Beck signified a shift away from public-power 
policies by the administration. In August the appointment of Dr. Paul 
Raver , chairman of the Illinois Commerce Commission, was announced. 
Raver adopted an eminently sane approach in his first public appearance 
in Oregon. The dispute over industrial versus home use of the power from 
Bonneville was pointless, he told the Portland City Club; "There is power 
enough in the Columbia River for both purposes -- if we use it wisely."12 
Despite such moderation, the new administrator pleased the CCF. 
Sweetland assured Byron Carney that '~all of us" have confidence in Raver 
11Portland Oregonicm, March 15, 1939, P• l, and Hay 11, 1939; p. 4; 
Sweetland to E. K. Burlew, April 6, 1939; Robert Beck to Sweetland, May 7, 
1939, with attached exchange with Banks and Ickes. 
12Portland Oregonian, August 22, 1939, p. l; Bonneville Administra-
tion Press Release, September 29, 1939. 
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as an "astute supporter of public power." "[W]e are all full of hope 
because of his presence." The public- power people could use some hope, 
for they were hard at work on a number of campaigns for PUD•s. During 
the SUII'J~er there had been three PUD elections, and in Washington, Clack-
amas, and Coos counties as well as in Portland there were PUD committees 
a.t work, but elsewhere the cause was still dormant.13 
Efforts to get PUD elections were still hindered by divisions among 
the members of the public-power bloc. Carl D. Thompson, president of the 
American Public Ownership League; sensed fertile fields for public power 
in Oregon, and by late 1939 he had established himself in the state, 
joined the CCF, and become a consultant to the Bonneville Administration. 
Thompson was frustrated by the divisions among the faithful and in July, 
1939, had begun setting up still another organization, the Oregon Commit-
tee of the Public Ownership League, in an effort to achieve united back-
ing for PUD campaigns. The members of the new organization were carefully 
screened for co-operativeness and loyalty to the cause, and it came to 
include the usual group - - leaders from the Grange, Farmers' Union, and 
Commonwealth Federation. A. C. Heyman was chairman of the Oregon Com-
mittee, and many other members of the Commonwealth were involved in its 
work.14 
The OCF encouraged and kept in touch with · public-power efforts 
throughout the state through the Oregon Committee, and through its own 
~ . Sweetland to Byron G. Carney, September 28, 1939; Oregon Committee 
of the Public Ownership League of America, Bulletin No. 1, August 7, 1939. 
14oregon Committee, Bulletin No. 1, August 7, 1939, and No. 5, 
November 20, 1939; Carl D. Thompson to Sweetland, September 12, 1939. 
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members, but th~ Commonwealth was most involved in the campaign for a 
PUD in Portland. In July the People's Power League began the campaign 
by circulating preliminary petitions for a PUD. When these were success-
fully completed, the state Hydroelectric Commission held a hearing on the 
proposals, for which the CCF mustered its friends from the CIO and AFL, 
and from community, New Deal, and CX::F clubs. The state commission 
returned a favorable report on the project, and in February, 1940, the 
CCF-backed Bonneville-For-Portland Committee, headed by a member of the 
CCF, State Senator Harry Kenin, began circulating the final petition to 
place the proposal for a PUD on the ballot for the primary election in 
v~y 15 i A.0. • 
With the filing of the final petition the campaign for a Portland 
PUD was on in earnest. The proponents of a PUD considered the election 
of particular significance, feeling that success would break the "back-
bonen of the power companies in the Northwest. The power companies were 
concerned for the same reason and put out reams of literature attacking 
the PUD; the inevitable "citizens"' committees sprang up to fight the 
"vicious measure." The AFL cooled to public power as it got closer to 
home, for members of AFL unions were employed by the private power com-
panies. · In addition the backers of the PUD had to contend_ with the 
allegation that a PUD would pay no truces despite the fact that the 1939 
legislature passed a bill providing that PUD's be truced on the same basis 
15sweetland to Joel Wolfsohn, July 1, 1939; Speakers at PUD 
Preliminary Hearing, September 29, 1939; Sweetland t o Oliver, February 
14, 1940. 
., 
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as private companies.16 
In spite of the strenuous efforts of the backers of the proposed 
PUD, they were "swamped" in the election in May. Elsewhere the effort 
continued, and the elections in November resulted in the creation of five 
new PUD's which raised the total in Oregon to ten. The results of the 
public-power effort in Oregon were far from spectacular, and the state 
lagged behind Washington in the formation of PUD's; yet after the long 
lean years of effort, even five new districts were hailed as a major 
victory.17 
Compared to the bitter fall of 1937, the Oregon labor front was 
relatively quiet during 1939 and 1940. The AFL continued to oppose the 
Commonwealth Federation, and the Labor Press continued to attack the 
"Commonwealth-CIC-Communist group" as a "fungus political growth." These 
attacks were unpleasant, as Sweetland was personally reminded when the 
Central Labor Council condemned the appointment of Mrs. Sweetland to a 
federal civil-service position, but they no longer did the OCF much harm. 
The OCF would have been much stronger had it had full support from the 
AFL, and such support might have encouraged some of the AFL's traditional 
agricultural allies to work more closely with the Commonwealth. Once 
having withheld this support, however, the AFL did little additional 
~amage with its continual harping on the Commonwealth menace. T~e State 
16sweetland to Oliver, February 14, 1940; Flyer, "The ABC of the 
PU D," by the Citizens' Committee .Against PUD; Oregon Labor Press, 
September 29, 1939, P• 1. 
17Portland Oregonian, May 18, 1940, p. l; Oregon Committee, Victory 
Bulletin, November 10, 1940. 
-
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Federation of Labor no longer had a leader of the public stature of the 
late Ben Osborne, the AFL was weakened by the growth of the CIO, and 
there were signs that the AFL's membership t _ook the attacks upon the 
Commonwealth with a grain of salt.18 
• 
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Members of AFL unions continued to attend the CCF's conventions and 
to serve on its board of directors, and a number of AFL locals co-operated 
in CCF projects. Officials of the AFL denied that any AFL locals were 
actually affiliated with the Commonwealth, which, they claimed, misrepre-
sented. the actions of a few misguided individuals. The CCF was indeed 
casual about what constituted its membership. It is impossible to tell 
how many of the members of AFL unions who participated in the Commonwealth 
were official delegates from an affiliated union, or "fraternal" dele-
gates from an interested butunaffiliated ~on, or representing no one 
. 19 but themselves. 
The main strength of the CCF continued to be in Oregon's CIO unions, 
and particularly in the big Columbia River District Council of the IWA. 
The CCF's executive board was eager to make the connection with the CIO 
even more secure by formal affiliation with John L. Lewis's Labor's Non-
Partisan League. In January, 1938, the board had voted to open negotia-
tions with the League toward this goal; but although E. L. -Oliver assured 
Sweetland that the "national organization will look with great favor upon 
such a proposal," the board decided the time was not yet propitious for 
18oregon Labor Press, March 24, 1939, P• l; April 21, 1939, p~ l; 
April 4, 1940, P• 4; January 12, 1940, p. 3. 
19Ibid., January 19, 1940, P• l. 
.) 
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-the move, and took no _further action. By the fall of 1939 the OCF's 
leaders decided the step must be taken soon if the OCF were to derive 
maximum benefit out of its connection with the League during the elec-
tions of 1940, and put the question on the agenda for the convention of 
December, 1939.20 
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At the convention Al Hartung of the IWA opened the discussion by 
moving that the Commonwealth Federation affiliate with the League. Tu.me-
diately the motion was assailed by delegates who claimed the proposal took 
them by surprise and tried to have consideration of the matter postponed 
until the following day. After much parliamentary maneuvering this effort 
failed, and the convention finally approved the motion to affiliate with 
but one dissenting voice.21 
Curiously, the opposition to affiliation with the League did not 
come from farmers or members of AFL unions. The opponents of affiliation 
who are identified in the convention minutes were all CIO men, mostly from 
the Portland Longshoremen's Union. Sweetland claimed that the opposition 
to affiliation came ·from about fifteen "Communist delegates.n22 
The controversy about the role of Communists in the Oregon Common-
wealth Federation started with its organization. The AFL and the Capital 
Journal accused the OCF of being Communist-dominated, rumors spread in 
20sweetland to Oliver, January 31, 1938; Oliver to Sweetland, 
February 7, 1938, and November 10, 1939; Sweetland to Oliver, November 
13, 1939. 
21Minutes of the sixth OCF Convention, December 9-10, 1939. 
22sweetland to Oliver, Decembe! 12, 1939. 
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rural districts, and anonymous pamphlets and flyers circulated identifying 
the OCF as a "Communist Organization" and as an "agency to put Communists 
or their duped tools into office." The controversy continues more than 
twenty years later. When Sweetland ran for secretary of state in 1960, 
materials based in part on his association with the OCF circulated accus-
ing him of Communist activities during the thirties.23 
The Oregon Commonwealth Federation was organized by non-Communist 
reformers, but soon a few persons who were believed to have Communist 
sympathies were working within it. While Sweetland and other leaders 
of the OCF were aware that there were Communist sympathizers in the OCF 
and regarded them with suspicion, they seemed to have no qualms about 
using their energy as long as the Communists appeared to be working for 
the same immediate ends. Sweetland apparently felt that he and the other 
liberals could defeat the fellow travelers if a real test came, and he 
proved to be correct.24 
There was really no danger of the Communist faction assuming control 
of the Federation as long as the OCF retained the support of the Columbia 
River District Council of the r~A. Some of the international officers of 
the IWA had Communist leanings, but the Columbia River District was the 
23sweetland to Herbert Michelbrook, February 10, 1938; Pamphlet, 
9regcm Wants No Corrmunist-Recommended Officials; Flyer, "Candidates 
endorsed by the Oregon Commonwealth Federation (A Communist Organization)"; 
Portland Oregonian, May 27, 1961, P• 1. 
24Willard Uphaus to Sweetland, January 281 1938; Sweetland to 
Uphaus, February 11, 1938; Panek to Sweetland, Oct ober 8, 1938; Sweet-
land to Panek, October 13, 1938. 
focal point of anti-Communist sentiment in the union, and Al Hartung, 
president of the Council, became vice-president of the OCF after Harry 
Gross died in 1938.25 
Until December 7, 1941, the touchiest subject in the OCF was its 
stand on foreign relations. The first convention adopted a plank. in the 
platform calling for the preservation of peace through the co-operation 
of all democratic peoples against "fascist aggressor nations." The 
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· communist Party line favored collective security, and the phrase "fascist 
aggressor nations" had currency in Communist circles, but many non-
Communists who were alarmed at Hitler and Mussolini took the same posi-
tion. A number .of Commonwealth members dissented from the Federation's 
stand, including Sweetland, who as a pacifist objected to the threat of 
force implied by the doctrine of collective security.26 
Despite the endeavors of Sweetland and others, the plank adopted 
by the convention of April, 1937, remained the official position of the 
OCF on foreign affairs until April, 1939. Revisions of the platform 
were considered ·at the spring convention in 1939, and the majority report 
of the platform.committee recommended changing the wording of the foreign-
relations plank from "fascist aggressor nations" to "all aggressor 
nations." After much discussion a compromise wording was adopted which 
250n the issue of Communism in the IWA and the-role of Don Helmick, 
Al Hartung and the Columbia River District Council in the struggle for 
control of the IWA, see Jensen, Lumber~ Labor; Galenson, ~ .QIQ 
Chal~enge ~~!fl:; and Proceed~~~ Constitutional Conventions 
of the International Woodworkers of America, 1937-1941. 
- - _.-:.,;;;:;;:.;.;;;.,;;;;.;....,..;,.. ............................ _ -
26Frances Orser to Sweetland, July 20, 1940; Panek to Sweetland, 
October 81 1938; Sweetland to Ray Newton, August 16, 1939. 
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called for an embargo against "Nazi, fascist and all other aggressor 
nations." Sweetland reported to a friend that he had heard that Morris 
Rappaport, the Corranunist Party functionary for the Northwest, was "quite 
perturbed" with the change in the OCF's position. However, he mused, 
"[i]t occurs to me that the delegates are beginning to learn.n27 
Although the Communist Party may have been perturbed with the OCF's 
action, the Party did·not turn its tiny but vocal group of supporters 
against the Federation until the following fall. Then it was not a 
change in the Commonwealth position that explained its ire, but an event 
far from the provincial field of Oregon politics - the Nazi-Soviet Pact. 
After the Pact the Communist Party discarded its advocacy of collective 
security; from the fall of 1939 until the German invasion of Russia in 
the summer of 1941, the Communist Party in the United States was an 
ardent advocate of peace and neutrality. 
At the meeting of the OCF 9 s board of directors on September 16, 1939, 
a heated discussion took place on a resolution dealing with the Common-
wealth's position on foreign policy. After many votes, the board decided 
to leave the whole matter until a. later date. On October 15, the board 
again took up the discussion. This time four of the .board members 
introduced a mimeographed resolution entitled "For a peaceful America." 
The resolution began: 
WHEREAS the present war in Europe is an Imperialist War be-
tween ••• British-French warmongers and German fascism, each 
seeking domination of the earth, and is the direct result of 
the Chamberlain appeasement policy and, 
27Minutes of the fifth OCF Convention, April 15-16, 1939; Sweetland 
to Clayton Van Lydegraf, April 22, 1939. 
• 
WHEREAS the scope of this Imperialist war has been narrowed 
down and confined to these three countries due to the con-
sistent peace policy of the USSR •••• 
The rest of the resolution asserted that the "warmongers of America are 
doing all within their power to tie our country to Chamberlain for the 
furtherance of British-French imperialism" and demanded that the United 
States stay out of the war. The resolution provoked pointed discussion, 
and the board rejected it with only its four sponsors voting for it. 
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The board then adopted a different resolution from which the four sponsors 
of "For a peaceful America" dissented. This resolution expressed the 
hope that the United State'.3 would stay out of war, as "we believe war 
will inevitably bring to our nation • • • the very dictatorship which 
we detest." However, it promised support to "every step which the 
President and Congress make toward that end," urged the re-election of 
. I 
FDR for a third term, and called for improved transcontinental highways 
as a defensive measure that would also provide considerable employment.28 
Another debate on foreign affairs took place at the sixth convention 
in December, 1939. A resolution condemning Germany and the Soviet Union 
for the partition of Poland and the Soviet Union for the invasion of 
Finland was introduced at the convention. One delegate opposed the 
resolution with the frank statement that "[m]y sympathies are still with 
the Russian experiment." others were more devious. The convention was 
cautioned not to take the side of "Hoover and the .reactionaries"; that 
"red-baiting" would not solve international problems; that the resolution 
28Minutes of the OCF Board of Directors, September 16, 1939, and 
October 15, 1939. Both resolutions are attached to the Board's minutes 
of September 16, 1939. 
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would help drive America into war; and that the OCF was carrying on 
like the Second International in 1914 - talking peace but supporti~ 
war. These imaginative arguments were of no avail, and the convention 
passed the resolution by a vote of 85 to 56.29 
The same delegates who were most vocal in their opposition to the 
resolution on foreign affairs also opposed affiliating with Labor's 
Non-Partisan League and working for the re-election of President Roose-
velt. A few Socialists joined the Communist faction in opposing the 
resolution favoring a third tenn for FDR, but the resolution passed by 
a vote of 104 to 13. When the convention was over, Sweetland could 
report to E. L. Oliver that "there is not a single member of the Commun-
ist Party on the new Board.u30 
When the Communist faction found its attempts to sw:ing the Common-
wealth to the new party line thwarted in the meetings of the board of 
directors and at the convention, it launched an attack upon the Common-
wealth Federation from several angles. One form of the attack was an 
attempt to ·weaken the relationship between the OCF and Labor's Non-
Partisan League. In November one of the members of the OCF board who 
had sponsored the resolution "For a peaceful America" began an attem~ 
to get direct affiliation with Labor's Non-Partisan League for the 
Maritime Federation of the Pacific's District Council, on which he 
also served. The reason he gave for this action was that there was n0 . 
29Mi.nutes of the sixth OCF Convention, December 9-10, 1939, 
30Ibid.; Sweetland to Oliver, December l2, .1939. 
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organization in Oregon which could be "relied upon to put into operation 
a planned, strong political program for organized labor." In February, 
1940, after the OCF had been designated as the League's official repre-
sentative in Oregon, he was still trying to circumvent the OCF by gaining 
direct affiliation with the League !or the Maritime Council, but the move 
was defeated in the Maritime Council. There were rumors of similar 
attempts being made in other unions, but none materialized.31 
In the Portland Industrial Union Council the Communist faction 
tried to prevent the Council from sending delegates to the convention 
of the OCF. According to the Labor Newdealerts report of the Council's 
December meeting, Mark Haller of the Inlandboatmen, a member of the 
board of the OCF, started the discussion. He opposed sending delegates 
to t he convention because he claimed it 1was being packed with OCF members-
at- large. A representative of the Cannery Workers took up the cry by 
attacking the board as "anti-labor" and in favor of the "huge armaments 
program of the administration." Harry Pilcher of the Longshoremen, 
another member of the board, attacked a recent resolution of the board 
as "anti- labor." Sweetland was on hand to answer these attacks, and the 
Council decided to send delegates to the convention by a vote of nearly 
three to one.32 
The Labor Newdealer (no longer edited by Bob Wilmot) appeared to 
be !ollow.i.ng the Communist line during this period. On September 8, 1939, 
31George Kell to Oliver, February 14, 1940; Oliver t o Kell, 
February 19, 1940; Sweetland to Oliver, February 24, 1940. 
32Labor ,!iewdealer, December 8, 1939; Sweetland t o Oliver , December 
7, 1939. 
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the paper carried an article comparing the OCF to Gulliver awakening, and 
an editorial endorsing a resolution of the Portland Industrial Union 
Council that urged repeal of the neutrality act because it benefited 
Hitler. In October the Newdealer continued to carry small items of 
OCF news without editorial embellishment, and in November the OCF was 
simply ignored. In December the Newdealer began printing attacks upon 
the OCF as news items. By January the transition was complete, and the 
Ne~-dealer was attacking the Roosevelt administration, the anti-
Communist leadership of the Columbia River District Council of the IWA, 
and the OCF with equal virulence as "pro-war." 
Three small unions withdrew from the OCF shortly after the conven-
tion in December and during January, 1940, the Labor Newdealer printed 
statements from members of these unions ~laining why they left the 
Commonwealth. The reasons included everything from the OCF's failure 
to set up precinct organizations to accusations that the officers were 
allied with the ttsplitters [i.e. anti-Communists] who are trying to 
disrupt the CIO in Oregon." All. of the articles, however, cited the 
OCF's stand on foreign policy among their compl aints. One of the arti-
cles, for instance, complained that the OCF had "adopted a hysterical 
resolution echoing all the tpoor Finland' stories that have appeared in 
the Big Business newspapers. n33 
331abor Newdealer, January 4, 1940, January 12, 1940, and January · 
19, 1940. The Newdealer continued to attack the OCF, the CIO "splitters," 
and the Roosevelt administration until June, 1941. After the German 
attack on the Soviet Union, the paper was full of resol utions support-
ing full aid to the Soviet Union. An editorial of July 18, 1941, 
accused the administration not of being "pro-war," but of "playing the 
old game of appeasement of Fascism." 
These attacks, particularly when combined with attacks upon the 
Roosevelt administration and the anti-Communist group in the IWA, did 
the OCF more good than harm. Shortly after the convention, the big 
Forest Grove local of the IlvA, led by Don Helmick, reaffiliated with 
the OCF, and the Coos Bay Longshorements Union and the long "skeptical" 
Ladies' Garment Worker's local in Portland affiliated. These additions 
more than made up for the membership lost in the defecting unions.34 
lfuen the opposition of the Communist faction developed, Sweetland 
carried the Commonwealth's cause directly to the unions. In October, 
1939, he attacked the Communist Party at the IllA convention in IG.amath 
Falls and in February, 1940, did the same before the CIO convention in 
Eugene. In December he had appeared at the Portland Industrial Union 
Council to ward off attempts to keep the Council from sending delegates 
I 
to the convention. Later in December he attended a meeting of the Port-
land Longshoremen's local and took the floor to answer the Communist 
faction; the local gave the OCF a "rising vote of confidence." In this 
fight Sweetland was strongly supported not only by the other officers 
of the OCF, and by E. L. Oliver, but by the CIO state director, William 
Dal~Jlllple, and the CIO state secretary (and OCF vice-president), Ralph 
Peoples, as well as by many other union members .3 5 
The top officers of the Commonwealth were neither Communists nor 
34Ibid., February 9, 1940; Sweetland to Oliver, February 14, 1940. 
35Proceedings . .2f ~ Third Constitutional Q2._n,yention £! ~ 
International Woodwork.fil:§. 2£ America, 1939, P• 157; Excerpts from 
address by s~reetland before · the CIO Convention, February 11, 1940; 
Sweetland to Norman Littell, December 29, 1939;". William Dalrymple to 
CIO locals, March 16, 1940; Ralph Peoples to CIO locals, March 13, 
1940. 
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Communist sympathizers. They fought the efforts of the Communist faction 
to bend the OCF to changes in the Communist line and were successful. It 
is more difficult to tell how many Communist sympathizers there were 
elsewhere in the OCF. From April to December, 1939, four or five of the 
thirty-three members of the board of directors followed the Communist 
Party line on foreign affairs. In 1951 the Portland Qregonian identi-
( ~~ F,oa:J-,-~./l<.ni~>0 
fied one of these members, Mark Haller~ as the chairman of the Communist 
Party in Oregon. In a feature article based on an interview with Haller, 
the Oregonian reported that he had joined the party in 1931 and had been 
active in it ever since. Harry Pilcher, another member of the OCF 
boa.rd, was identified in the Labor Newdealer in 1941 as chairman of the 
Multnomah County Communist Party .36 
In addition to four or five members of the board, there seem to 
. . 
have been about ten other people who at one time or another were fairly 
active in the Connnonwealth Feder~tion and who frequently and conspicu-
ously supported Communist causes. The writer would hesitate to identify 
these people as confirmed fellow travelers, however, either because of 
insufficient information or because some of them seemed to depart from 
the Communist line from time to time. The Oregonian concluded that the 
fifty-six persons who voted against the . resolution condemning Germany and 
the $oviet Union constituted the rock-bottom Communist strength in the 
OCF. This seems highly unlikely for there is no other evidence that 
there were so many Communist sympathizers in the Federation and there 
3'1,unutes of the OCF Board of Directors, particularly September 16, 
1939, and October 15, 1939; Portland pregonian, September 30, 1951, p. 28; 
~E2! Newdealer, July 25, 1941. 
t-rere many reasons non-Comro:unists _might vote against the resolution. 
Indifference and ignorance were two such reasons. For instance, from 
the discussion of the resolution ttFor a Peaceful America" it is obvious 
that one of th~ members of the board hadn't the slightest idea that she 
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was participating in a test of strength between the Communist and liberal 
factions. There also were a number of members of the OCF who thought that 
the organization should stick to domestic problems and that foreign affairs 
were not worth splitting the Federation over. Previous conflicts over 
foreign affairs had been ignored or compromised; a vote against the 
resolution condemning Germany and the Soviet Union was a vote to handle 
the situation in the usual '1/tay _37 
Since 1937 the Commonwealth Federation had been the most active 
supporter of the New Deal in Oregon. Members were genuinely committed 
· to public power, public housing, more adequate pensions, and unemployment 
insurance, and were willing to fight for these programs. But by 1939 
grumbling could be heard about the lack of patronage going to thu OCF. 
Many of the Commonwealth's friends needed jobs and it seemed grossly 
unfair that the administration gave its recognition to people who did 
not support its program and occasionally tried to sabotage the New Deal. 
In December, 19~8, Sweetland told Oliver, "[f]rankly, our whole group 
here is getting pretty weary of everlastingly battling for the New Deal, 
and yet seeing virtually every key Federal post in the hands of the 
opposition.u38 
37Portland Oregonian, December 12, 1939, P• 8. 
38sweetland to Oli;er, December 5, 1938. 
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38sweetland to Oli;er, December 5, 1938. 
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The chief subject of complaint was the head of the Oregon Works 
Progress Administration, E. J. Griffith. According to the OCF, Griffith's 
subordinates deliberately pigeonholed a request of the OCF for a Portland 
housing survey. Griffith was unfair to the Workers' Alliance and was 
attempting to build a political machine of WPA workers. He did nothing 
to help the Democratic ticket in 1938 and issued a blast at ?-!rs. Honey-
man which did her considerable damage. Worst of all, he had required 
WPA workers to resign from membership in the CCF and Young Democrats, 
although this order had been countermanded from Washington. Griffith's 
whole patronage philosophy, Sweetland complained, was "that by taking in 
Republicans and unregenerate Democrats you make good New Dealers out of 
them - so far the net result has been to make the 'regular' Democrats 
sore." In a report aimed at Mrs. Roosevelt, Sweetland outlined other 
complaints: the Oregon Federal Housing Administration was "hopelessly 
reactionary"; the head of the National Emergency Council was "by every 
measure a Tory"; and the Bonneville Administration was "politically 
inept.n39 
However, after the successful petition campaign against the law 
changing the date of the primary election, the situation changed. In 
September, 1939, the OCF's first vice-president, Byron G. Carney was 
selected as state director of the . census of 1940 through the influence 
39statement by Jessie M. Short, n.d.; Statement by Trent Phillips, 
n.d.; Oliver to Sweetland, May 9, 1939, with copy of wire from Hownrd 
o. Hunter to E. J. Griffith, May 9, 1939; "Informal Report on Political 
Slant of Federal Office-Holders in Oregon," .n.d. Howard Costigan asked 
Sweetland for such a report to show to Mrs. Roosevelt when she visited 
Seattle, Costigan to Sweetland, March 16, 1939. 
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of Stephenson Smith. The announcement created consternation among state 
Democratic officials who apparently had not lmown that Carney was even 
in the running for the job (the OCF had been _prornoting him for the Fish 
Commission); when they got word of the appointment it "started the dishes 
rattling in the Democratic cupboard." The Party's chieftains, particu-
larly National Committeeman Howard Latourette and State Chairman Frank 
Tierney, were not eas'ily reconciled to the appointment, for they as well 
as Sweetland knew that it meant an opportunity to employ some 1,500 of 
the faithful, and in April, 1940, right before the primary election.40 
Telephone and telegraph messages flew between the upset party 
officials in Oregon and the capital. Carney reported that Jim Farley 
greeted him with "So youtre the bad fellow that is causing me a lot of 
trouble." Farley said, however, that he had advised Tierney that Carney's 
appointment would stand and had urged the officers o.f the party to 
co-operate.41 
With his position assured, Carney asked Sweetland, Mrs. Honeyman,-
and OCF treasurer Gus Solomon to start considering personnel for census 
positions. They agreed that some of the appointments mu.st be made with 
"an eye to appeasing some of the disconcerted elements," and recommended 
giving the top position in Portland to neither a member of the OCF nor 
to an old-guard Democrat, but to a member of an AFL union who was sym-
pathetic t9 the OCF but could gain the approval of at least some of the 
40Portland Oregonian, September ·13, 1939; P• 6; Carney to Heyman, 
October 28, 1939; Portland pregon Journal, September 17, 1939; p. 11; 
Salem Capital Journal, September 14, P• 1. 
4lcarney to Sweetland, September 28, 19.38. 
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Democratic official~.42 
For the next two months Carney and his Oregon friends exchanged 
long daily letters. Clearly there were just pot enough top positions 
for all the OCF's comp~tent, deserving, and needy, and unfortunately 
some of the needy were not competent, even if deserving. Appointments 
to appease the old guard caused headaches, too. Carney was urged in 
Washington to appoint Mrs. Emily Edson of the old guard as his assistant, 
but both Carney and Sweetland felt that she would jeopardize the entire 
project because of "her complete innocence of any idea of effective admin-
istration,'' something the OCF had overlooked when it endorsed Mrs. Edson 
for secretary of state in 1938.43 
Carney also ran into trouble with the friends of the OCF. Mrs. 
Pierce was very much interested in appointments in eastern Oregon. She 
insisted that the people she recommended went down to the "grass-roots 
of the country." "I think they do," Carney plaintively complained. 
"Clear down to Coolidge and McKinley." Carney finally agreed to let 
Walter Pierce handle all appointments in his district, but Carney assured 
the OCF that "we will be right there because he is going to run again and 
. M 
he will be glad to have me go over those names with them." 
In western Oregon Carney was to make the major appointments, but 
42sweetland to Carney, September 24, 1939, and September 28, 1939. 
43carney to Smith, October 7, 1939; Sweetland to Carney, September 
28, 1939. 
Mcarney to Sweetland, October 5, 1939; Carney t o Lottie [Mrs. 
Carney], October 21, 1939. 
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the director of the. census wanted appointees to have the endorsement of 
Latourette and Tierney in order to avoid another squabble with the state 
Democratic leaders. This developnent set oft a scurry to secure these 
endorsements., but the party chieftains ware reluctant. At the end of 
October, Carney urged Tierney to give an endorsement to anyone who asked 
for it., "because whoever was selected would feel that your recommendation 
had been of help ••• and the others ,rould feel that you had given them 
an equally fair chance." Tierney was unimpressed with this reasoning., 
and in November Carney was still trying to get Tierney to endorse some of 
the Commonwealth9s favorites.45 
When the dust settled, the OCF had placed many of its candidates 
in .top census positions. Some of these people., such as the supervisor 
for the southern Oregon district, were sympathetic to the Commonwealth 
but not closely identified with it. Others., however, such as Miss Ruth 
Haefner, the Portland area supervisor, and Mrs. Nathalie Panek, in the 
office at Salem, were among the most active _members of the CCF • .An 
announcement of the CCF reported that of the first sixty major census 
appointments, thirty-eight were well-known members of the Grange., 
Farmers' Union, AFL, or CIO., and that many of the rest were progressives, 
· 46 while a few were regular old-line Democrats. 
Census enumerators were to be appointed by the district supervisors. 
45carney to Lottie [Mrs. Carney], October 21, 1939; Carney to 
Frank Tierney, October 30., 1939, and November 7., 1939; Sweetland to· 
Tierney., November 24, 1939. 
46Portland Oregonian, December 3, 1939, P• l; News release, 
"Census Posts to Farmers and Labor," n.d. 
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Here, too, Sweetland was busy writing to friends of the OCF for the 
names of interested progressives, and checking the lists of applicants 
for the proper liberal sentiments. From the partial list of census 
employees in the Commonwealth files it is clear that many of the enumer-
ators were also from farm and labor groups, or were friends or relatives 
of the OCF's supporters. Others, however, had only their competence to 
recommend them. The applications for census positions give a vivid 
picture of the dislocations which accompanied the Depression. An amaz-
ing number of the applicants were lawyers and school teachers or had other 
training which should have prepared them for steady work, and a former 
clerk of the New York Supreme Court, a person with a Ph.D. from the 
University of Illinois, and a concert pianist were among the applicants.47 
Carney's appointment as head of the census was viewed as an indica-
tion that the national administration recognized the Commonwealth Federa-
tion as its chief supporter in the state. Consequently the appointment 
was interpreted as a direct slap at the state party leaders, many of whom 
had been Martin Democrats in the primary of 1938 and inactive or "Sprague 
Democrats" in November, 1938. The appointment was also construed as a 
bolster to the third-term movement, which the OCF led in Oregon and 
toward which the state Democratic leadership was distinctly cool. The 
Commonwealth Federation had favored a third term for Roosevelt long before 
there had been any hint of Carney's appointment to the census position, 
but that recognition may well have fired the OCF's enthusiasm even more. 
47sweetland to Merle Stuart, February 6, 1940; Marval Shurtliff 
to Sweetland, n.d.; Sweetland to Maudie Ellman, March 7, 1940. 
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A week after the convention of December, 1939, reaffirmed the Federation's 
support for the third term, the Commonwealth's petitions for placing FDR's 
name on the primary ballot in 1940 were in circulation. With his usual 
care, Sweetland sent copies of the petitions to James Rowe in the White 
House and to the President's son-in-law in Seattle.4$ 
The OCF had no difficulty in obtaining the necessary signatures, 
and Sweetland planned to file the petitions on February 6th, the first 
day of the filing period. Shortly before this date, however, Gus Solomon 
received a •'very insistent" letter from Lowell Mellett saying that 
Roosevelt did not want his name filed in Oregon's or in any other primary 
election. Having secured the signatures, the OCF was required by law 
either to file them or to obtain the permission of each signer to with-
draw his signature. These obstacles were enough, Sweetland wrote, but 
a recent attack on the administration by John L~ Lewis really made with-
drawal of the petitions impossible, "since any change on our part would 
be immediately attributed to his domination." The OCF would consider 
backing out of filing Roosevelt's name only if it received a "direct 
statement either from the Chief or someone who is willing to state that 
they spoke with his permission." No statement was forthcoming, and the 
OCF went ahead and filed the petitions.49 
The OCF had much more difficulty deciding on a candidate to support 
for the vice-presidency. A representative of Burton K. Wheeler attended 
48salem Capital ~o~rnal, September 14, 1939, p. 1; Sweetland to 
James Rowe, December 15, 1939; to John Boettiger, December 15, 1939. 
49News release, January 31, 1940; Sweetland to Helen Fuller, 
February 6, 1940; to Lowell Mellett, February 5, 1940. 
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the convention in December, 1939, and aroused a good deal of support. 
Sweetland had begun asking for advice from the League in the fall of 
1939 but got no help from that quarter. In April he reported to Oliver 
that the old-line Democrats were conducting a write-in campaign for 
Assistant Secretary of War Louis Johnson. Sweetland thought the OCF 
could easily beat Johnson with a write-in candidate of their own and 
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was eager for the Commonwealth to back a "reliable anti-war progressive" 
for the vice-presidency to express the Commonwealth's "considerable 
reservations" about Roosevelt's foreign policy. There were still no 
suggestions from the League, and the OCF convention late in April decided 
to conduct a write-in campaign for Senator Robert La Follette, although 
the primary was just a few weeks away.50 
The Federation had been actively prel)?-ring for state and local 
campaigns since the previous fall. Sweetland devoted six weeks early 
in 1940 to setting up county organizations, which were put to work find-
ing candidates and encouraging registration and precinct organization. 
In this election the OCF extended its efforts beyond the vicinity of 
Portland and took a hand in encouraging progressive activity from Coos 
and Curry counties to Malheur County. More than twenty-five candidates 
for the state legielature had the OCF's encouragement, as did several 
candidates for local offices in Multnomah County.51 
After filing Roosevelt's name in the primary and paying for the 
50sweetland to Oliver, December 12, 1939, and April 18, 1940; 
Minutes of the seventh OCF Convention, April 28, 1940. 
· 5lsweetland to Oliver, February 14, 1940; to Arthur Pulford, 
April 18, 1940; to Anthony Yturri, April 15, 1940; to Dalrymple, 
April 16, 1940. 
corresponding pages in the Vote~'s Pamphl~ the OCF naturally campaigned 
for delegates loyal to the New Deal for the Democratic national conven-
tion. In addition to Commonwealth members Stephenson Smith, David c. 
Epps and Monroe Sweetland, the convention endorsed five other persons 
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for the ten-member delegation. General Martin, who was the leader of 
John Nance Garner's supporters in Oregon, was running for one of the 
positions as delegate-at-large, and the OCF was as eager to defeat the 
General as it was to elect candidates it supported. The OCF's convention 
also endorsed Pierce for re-election, Mrs. Honeyman for her old seat in 
the third Congressional district, and Lyman Ross for state treasurer.52 
The efforts of the Commonwealth were seriously handicapped by 
inadequate funds. Much of its money was going into the campaign for 
a PUD in Portland, and the remaining funds were not adequate to cover 
all the races in which the OCF was interested. The OCF put out flyers 
listing the OCF-endorsed candidates in Multnomah and Clatsop counties, 
but other campaign literature consisted only of a modest advertisement 
the day before the election in the Coos Bay and Eugene papers.53 
Portland turned down the PUD by a substantial vote, and Lyman Ross 
was defeated in the Democratic primary for state treasurer. Elsewhere 
the OCF's candidates did well. About two thirds of its candidates for 
the legislature won, and half of the Oregon delegation to the Democratic 
convention was elected with the OCF's help; although Sweetland was de-
52Sweetland to Herman Kenin, March 25, 1940; Minutes of the 
seventh OCF Convention, April 28, 1940. 
53sweetland to Mellett, May 2, 1940. 
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feated, Epps and Smith were on the delegation, and General Martin was not. 
Walter Pierce and Mrs. Honeyman won their races, and Roosevelt defeated 
Garner by a huge vote. Roosevelt would undoubt~dly have won the presi-
dential primary in Oregon without any help from the Commonwealth, but the 
OCF could take much of the credit for the fact that there was a presiden-
tial primary, and all of the credit for entering Roosevelt's name in it. 
Robert La Follette led the field of eight in the vote for a Democratic 
vice-presidential candidate. Sweetland enthusiastically told Oliver that 
the vote for La Follette was the best indication of the OCF•s strength. 
Perhaps it was because La Follette ran best in areas where the OCF was 
. . 
strongest, but very few people bothered to vote in so meaningless an 
election, and even if Sweetland was right about the meaning of the vote, 
it is difficult to understand his enthusiasm.54 
Although the OCF was still officially nonpartisan, by 1940 it 
was acting almost solely as a pressure group within the Democ~atic Party, 
where it had discovered that approximately 80 per cent of the OCF member-
ship was registered. "The real battleground at this time between progress 
and reaction is the Democratic Party," Sweetland told the state CIO con-
vention.55 
Throughout 1939 and 1940 Sweetland urged friends of the OCF to 
file for precinct committeeman or committeewoman, and following the 
primary of 1940 the OCF had enough strength in county Democratic commit-
tees to justify an attempt to oust the state chairman, Frank Tierney. 
Immediately after the primary, Sweetland wrote to friends of the OCF 
54Portland Oregonian, May 18, 1940, p. l; Oregon Blue Book, 1941-
~, pp. 223-26; Oregon Voter, June 22, 1940, PP• 16-18. 
55Excerpts from address by Sweetland before the CIO Convention, 
February 11, 1940. 
throughout the state urging them to organize the progressive members 
of their county Democratic committees .behind a common slate of progres-
sive officers. Sweetland reminded them to concentrate on electing the 
state committeeman and committeewoman from their county, for the state 
committee elected the state officers, and to sacrifice the county chair-
manship to the old guard if necessary. If the progressives were weak, 
Sweetland urged them to at least try to elect a state committeewoman. 
The old guard might permit this, he thought, since they seemed to think 
the post was unimportant, but women had an equal vote on the state com-
wittee. Sweetland also used the possibility of selecting some of the 
state officers from outside Multnomah County as bait to enlist support. 
The state leaders from Multnomah County "have become so involved in the 
intrigues and mane~verings of Portland politics that we all know abso-
lutely nothing has been done to strengthen the Party upstate," Sweetland 
confided to Democrats in eastern Oregon.56 
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Using this strategy, the ocr picked up a vote on the state committee 
from many counties, and in several counties the progressives elected 
their entire slate of officers. In Multnomah County, the Commonwealth's 
organization paid off with the election of a prominent member as state 
committeewoman, and an "ally" of the OCF defeated the fonner county 
chairman for state committeeman.57 
56sweetland to precinct committeemen and women, ~ray 23, 1940; 
Sweetland to Robert Bradford, June 8, 1940. 
57sweetland to Stuart, June 25, 1940; Heyman to Sweetland, June 
16 1940· Sweetland to Multnomah County precinct committeemen and women, 
n.d.; to'Morris Fisher, June 19, 1940; "Democratic County Central Com-
. mittee Election," Multnomah County, June 25, 1940~ 
., 
89 
Sweetland thought the OCF might have enough votes to elect the 
state Democratic chairman, but it was decided that an attempt to do so 
would seriously damage party unity. The OCF did, however, insist on a 
chairman who was loyal to the New Deal, had the confidence of the admin-
istration, and had "some sense of the import~nce of organization, parti-
cularly in the up-state districts. 11 In Charles Leach the OCF's strate-
gists believed they had found a good compromise candidate. Although he 
had generally been identified with the conservative wing of the party, 
Leach had supported the Democratic ticket in 1938 and had shown himself 
to be willing to co-operate with the CCF. The Commonwealth backed Leach, 
and he was elected. Sweetland was even more pleased with the selection 
of the vice-president for women's affairs, Mrs. Joan Dixon of Hood River. 
She was not only a strong New Dealer, he reported, but was energetic, 
and she started on a tour of eastern Oregon "to stir up party workers" 
the week after h~r election.58 
Inadequate finances again hampered the Commonwealth's efforts in 
the general election. Despite the OCF's victory in the state Democratic 
committee, the committee remained its "usual uninspired and uninspiring 
self." Consequently much of the burden of the campaign fell on the OCF. 
Its help from Washington, D.C. was earmarked for V.rs. Honeyman's cam-
paign, the IWA was spending heavily on an organizational drive, and the 
available union money was designated for particular legislative races. 
The nomination of Oregon's Charles McNary as the Republican vice-
- ~---------
58sweetland to Bradford, June 8, 1940; to David K. Niles, August 
6, 1940; to Thomas Roe, n.d. 
.j)residential candidate made the Willkie ticket a real threat in Oregon, 
Sweetland thought, unless Willkie's association with private power com-
panies could be made the issue. For this purpose the state branch of 
the Independent Committee for Roosevelt and Wallace, headed by Repub-
licans Harry Kenin and State Grange Yaster Gill, could do particularly 
effective work among Oregon's Republican power-conscious farmers. But 
the state Democratic party was unwilling to give the Independent Com-
mittee financial support.59 
The prospect of receiving financial support from Labor's Non-
Partisan League was dim as a result of the direction that organization 
was taking and the resignation of E. L. Oliver in June. Oliver could no 
l~nger conscientiously serve the League, he explained, because it was 
apparent that Lewis meant to step up his attack on Roosevelt and was 
allying with Communists in pursuing this course. After Oliver's resig-
nation, correspondence between the League and the CCF dropped to only 
the occasional exchange of routine reports.60 
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By early September the OCF's financial position was desperate, and 
Sweetland wrote to Oliver, who was then working for the American Labor 
Party, to ask if he knew of anyone interested in preserving organizations 
like the CCF. The Commonwealth Federation had decided not to appeal to 
the League, Sweetland told Oliver, "for reasons which I think you will 
understand." But by the end of the month the Commonwealth was reduced 
59sweetland ~o Tex Goldschmidt, August 10, 1940; to Oliver, Sep-
tember 10, 1940; to Verda Barnes, August 6, 1940. 
60Press release of letter from Oliver to John L. Lewis, June 21, 
1940; Oliver to Sweetland, June 22, 1940. 
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to asking help even from the League. "We have pledges of less than 
$700.00 for this whole all-important campaign, 0 Sweetland wrote. But 
the League did not come to the aid of the OCF, and when John L. Lewis 
endorsed Willkie in October, Sweetland fired off a wire of protest. The 
OCF did scrape together enough money to put Sweetland on the radio a few 
days before election, and much of his address was devoted to an attack 
on Lewis and the Communist Party for their opposition to Roosevelt.61 
Roosevelt carried Oregon for the third time in 1940, but by less 
than forty thousand votes. More than half of the margin came from 
Multnomah County, where the OCF had conducted a vigorous registration 
drive under the direction of Nathalie Panek. Mrs. Honeyman again lost 
to Homer Angell in the third Congressional district, but the OCF's 
candidates fared a little better in the legislative races than they 
had in 1938.62 
6lsweetland to Oliver, September 10, 1940; to John T. Jones, 
September 28, 1940; to Lewis, October 22, 1940; Address by Sweetlan<;l, 
KEX, November 2, 1940. 
62oregon ~ ~, 1941-1943,, PP• 227-28. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE DECLINE OF THE OREGON COMMONWEALTH FEDERATION 
The Commonwealth Federation wound up 1940 with its eighth semi-
annual convention in December. "[T]his convention marks the end of the 
formative period of our Federation," the executive secretary told the 
gathering. "Your Federation is now an accepted political institution 
of our state."1 
The OCF was noticed, to be sure, but it was not yet "accepted," 
-particularly in some circles of labor. Despite the attack of the Commun-
ists on the OCF during the preceding year, the AFL showed no sign of 
warming toward the Commonwealth. Indeed the Labor Press printed some 
of its most virulent attacks upon the OCF during this period. During 
1941 the paper carried a series of articles on ''The Enemy Within." The 
"enemy" was, of course, the Communist Party, and the Labor Press applied 
the red brush to many of the members of the OCF with rather indiscriminate 
zeal. 2 Communism was still an issue in the IWA, where the opposition 
faction had stepped up their attack on the Communist-leaning leadership 
of the international union. This fight inevitably spilled over into 
11unutes of the e~v~th OCF Convention, December 14-15, 1940, 
Appendix II. 
2orego,n Labor Press, particularly the column, "The Enemy Within," 
between June 6, 1941 and July 11, 1941. 
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the CCF. 
In his report to the eighth convention, Sweetland dealt at 
some length with the activities of the Communist Party, which through-
out the year had done "ever-,rthing in its power to injure and discredit" 
the Commonwealth Federation. Sweetland concluded this part of his report 
with an appeal to the convention not to join in the current attempt to 
bar the Communist Party from the ballot. 
[I]t is my opinion that this offensive and vicious minor-
ity furnishes the acid test of our faith in civil liberties 
in our democracy •••• [W]e should much prefer that the 
Communists would run on their own ticket and the channels 
of democratic expression be kept open, than to suppress 
them by legal action.3 
In spite of Sweetland's plea, Don Helmick, one of the leading 
oppositionists in the IWA, moved that "the Communist party, Nazi party, 
or Fascist party organizations, or any other group whose object is the 
abolition of constitutional government be condemned and be denied 
affiliation with CCF, and that we support the prohibition of such groups 
from the American ballot.n4 
Leading the fight against the motion was Francis J. Murnane of 
the Plywood and Veneer Workers' Union, who urged the convention "not to 
go on record against civil liberties." In the course of the long debate, 
Sweetland tried to amend the resolution by dropping the phrase support-
in~ the exclusion of Communists from the ballot. He was defeated in 
3~.iinutes of the eighth OCF Convention, December 14-15, 1940, 
Appendix II. 
4Minutes of the eighth OCF Convention, December 14-15, 1940. 
l 
this attempt, however, and Helmick's original motion finally carried 
by a vote of fifty-four to twenty-eight.5 
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On the following day Murnane's black eye was the talk of the 
convention. Murnane charged that five "goons" assaulted him as he left 
the session because of his opposition to Helmick's resolution. The 
resolution, he thought, was intended to "bar all persons who oppose 
Helmick and Al F. Hartung." Murnane denied being a Communist himself 
and said that he would continue "in spite of goon squads, psychopathic 
cases, and homicidal maniacs to endeavor to advance the cause of labor 
and American civil liberties." According to Murnane, three of his 
assailants were delegates to the convention, and the leader of the 
"squad" had been elected to the board of directors.6 
The incident, which was ignored in the minutes and in the 
friendly Salem Capital Press, was given prominent coverage in the 
Labor Ne~rdealer. It provided an opportunity for that paper to attack 
two of its favorite whipping boys at the same time - the "pro-war" 
bloc in the IWA and the OCF. The resolution, reported the Newdealer, 
was the usual red-baiting and was "intended to provide employers with 
a weapon to use in crushing labor."7 
5~. 
6Portland Oregon Journal, December 16, 1940, P• l; Labor llilli-
dealer, December 20, 1940. 
71abor Newdealer, December 20, 1940. The Oregon Industrial· 
Union Council (CIO) repudiated the Labor Newdealer in February, 1941. 
The opposition faction gained control of the nvA in 1941, and the 
internation union adopted a constitutional amendment barring Commun-
ists from membership. 
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The resolution was not only opposed by a faction in the CIO. 
Long-time leaders of the OCF, such as ·Roy Hewitt, Byron Carney, and 
A. C. Heyman, opposed it, as did Sweetland and Smith. Heyman had been 
elected to the OCF's board of directors at the convention. Later in 
December, he wrote to the board explaining his absence from a recent 
meeting. He opposed the resolution, and assumed that he would not have 
been elected to the board had he been able to make his opinion known at 
the convention. The OCF had always stressed civil liberties and welcomed 
all liberal groups who were looking for more liberty and justice, Heyman 
continued. His first contact with Communists had been at meetings of 
the OCF and "I, for one welcomed their energy and activity." Had not 
the OCF bored from within in the Democratic Party? "As I see it, the 
communists have used similar tactics and also have made their contri-
bution. n If there was any truth in socialism it could not be suppressed 
and "[i]f the communists have a more direct and logical plan for bring-
ing about socialism than the old line socialists, then, for God sake, 
let's listen to their_ argument and accept whatever contribution they 
can make.tt8 But the OCF was past the stage where help from any and 
every quarter was accepted. 
The financial condition of the Commonwealth had not improved 
following the elections of 1940. t'We have not yet learned to finance 
our work and are constantly harassed and restricted by our lack of 
revenue," Sweetland told the eighth convention. To Washington, D. c., 
8Heyman to OCF Board of Directors, December 31, 1940. 
-in another appeal for help, he reported that something had to be done 
"about the terrific incubus of debt which has us almost strangled at 
the moment" if the OCF was to do effective legislative work in 19U. 
The delegates to the convention voted to eliminate one of the semi-
annual conventions to reduce expenses. In addition the convention 
prepared a resolution to be submitted to affiliated organizations for 
ratification. It called for each affiliate to pay twenty-five cents 
per member per year in addition to the regular dues. Confident that 
·the resolution would be ratified, the convention urged major efforts 
on behalf of a number of bills in the coming legislature and appointed 
a legislative committee.9 
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The OCF's "People's Lobby" was established in the Senator Hotel 
in Salem when the legislature opened in 1941. Members were Sweetland, 
state CI0 President John Brost, CI0 Secretary and OCF Vice-President 
Ralph Peoples, Miss Ruth Haefner, who was active in the Portland League 
of Women Voters, Byron Carney, and Wendell Barnet.t, a Socialist fanner 
from Gervais. This group sent weekly _bulletins on the legislature to 
the OCF's affiliates, rounded up.the friends of the OCF for hearings, 
and attempted to induce legislators to vote for bills that the OCF 
approved. However, the effort on behalf of particular bills was 
secondary to an effort to arouse interest in the legislative process. 
Every two weeks during the session Sweetland gave radio talks on the 
legislature. The theme, sounded. again and again, was "help make demo-
9Minutes of the eighth OCF Convention, December 14-15, 1940, 
and Appendixes II and III; Si-reetland to Niles, December 30, 1940. 
cracy work," and the message was that democracy, like charity, begins 
at home. 
W'e have yet a little time at least to set our democracy in 
order, before the erosion of faith ·which results from ill 
health, unemployment, insecurity and despair has undermined 
and destroyed our America as it has the other democracies. 
No one here or abroad decides this £or us - we decide that 
problem for ourselves. It's up to us all from now on to 
help make democracy work.10 
97 
To aid the cause the OCF offered "honest and accurate reports 
directly from the firing line in Salem," but made no pretense of being 
impartial. The OCF was partial - to the farmer and laborer, the senior 
citizen without a decent pension, the student, and the family with 
medical bills - in short, to the "people." The Commonwealth did not 
have a single_fonnula for making democracy work, and the People's Lobby 
backed bills providing for everything from free blood tests for syphilis 
to forest conservation.11 
To fight the battle for the people, the Commonwealth counted 
upon eight assemblymen who were members of the CIO, AFL, or a Railroad 
Brotherhood. These, together with the other ·liberals who supported the 
CCF's general program, made up about a fourth of the lower house. In 
the Senate the OCF was even weaker. The first fight of the session was 
for Robert Farrell for speaker of the house. Farrell was a Republican 
and no flaming liberal, but the CCF accused his opponent of being a 
lOSmith to Members of the 41st Oregon Legislature, January 8, 
1941; Radio address, "Legislative Round-Up," by Sweetland, KEX, March 
20, 1941. 
llRadio address by Sweetland, KEX, January 18, 19U. 
member of the Associated Farmers. The Commom-realth cited Farrell's 
election as a significant victory and felt that he gave liberals a 
fair share of committee assignments.12 
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During the session the People's Lobby devoted considerable atten-
tion to bills providing for increased pensions, repeal of the seasonal-
ity clause in the unemplo;yment compensation act, and the establishment 
of junior colleges. The major bill framed and backed by the OCF pro-
vided for state medical insurance for lo~r-income families. 
The OCF had called for some type of medical insurance in its 
original platform, but had taken no action on the matter until the spring 
convention of 1939. That convention instructed the board of directors 
t~ appoint a committee to study the problem and to draw up a bill to take 
to the legislature. By 1941 the committee had prepared a bill which was 
introduced in the legislature by Dr. J. F. Hosch, who was a successful 
Bend physician. The CCF had no illusion that the bill could pass either 
house in 1941, but it did seem possible to begin focusing public atten-
tion on the problem of medical care for the needy.13 
The bill received twelve votes in the house, but the vote of 
Richard L. Neuberger, a freshman representative and a member of the OCF, 
was not among them. This created a minor flurry when Neuberger wrote 
to the editor of the magazine, Social pecuritz, explaining that the bill 
12s-weetland to John F. Sullivan, December 26, 1940; Legislative 
Notes, n.d.; OCF Legislative Bulletin, January 18, 1941. · 
lJvJl.nutes of the fifth annual OCF convention, April 15-16, 1939, 
Appendix II; Pamphlet, The Biggest "If:', by the OCF, n.d.; Sweetland to 
Arthur Capper, February 12, 1941; s,-reetland to Abraham Epstein, January 
27, 1941. 
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provided no revenue and that he didn't want to raise false hopes about 
medical insurance. To this Sweetland replied that tt[n]o vote cast by 
any member of the Oregon Legislature during the 1941 Session was more 
shocking" to liberals of Oregon than that cast by Neuberger against the 
health bill. Since it was obvious the bill would not pass, tr..e vote was 
on the principle of health insurance, Sweetland maintained, and Neuberger 
not only voted against it but gave the "chief speech against it." This 
exchange did not indicate a break between Neuberger and the OCF, but it 
was a reflection of a disconcerting tendency Sweetland believed Neuberger 
had of going his own way when he found it profitable.14 
While the OOF's legislative committee was engaged at the legis-
lature, CIO organizer Max Gardner was at work in Lane County. "We 
consider Lane- county just about the most important spot in the state 
just now, tt S·weetland wrote to Gardner in January, "since your work 
offers us hope of breaking into what has been an apparently impregnable 
reactionary fortress." By late .April some eleven new CIO unions had been 
organized among the lumber workers and fishermen in the county. The OCF 
was not far behind the CIO. As soon as the unions were formed, Sweetland 
urged them to inform their legislators that the People's Lobby spoke for 
them, and the OCF quietly began to form a Lane County OCF Council. 
Although labor was heavily represented in this endeavor, liberal Grangers 
provided the leadership.15 
14sweetland to Epstein, April 12, 1941; Epstein to Sweetland, 
April 24, 1941; Sweetland to Epstein, May 3, 1941. 
15sweetland to ¥.ax Gardner, January 28, 1941; to Harry Kenin; 
April 29, 1941; to Virgil Caskey, April 3, 1941; to Dr. C.H. Bailey, 
April 29, 1941. 
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The census of 1940 had given Oregon a fourth Congressional dis-
trict, which was established in southwestern Oregon. This develoµnent 
increased the political imporl.ance of Lane County, for it was the most 
populous area in the new district. When the Lane County OCF Council 
held its first public meeting late in April, the event created some 
interest. Both Democrats and Republicans, reported the Eugene Register-
Guard, saw the formation of the Council as a move by "the Commomrealthers 
to set themselves up in the valley ·with a view to splitting old-line 
votes and making their bid for national recognition via the new con-
gressional district.n16 
From Lane County, the OCF's attention turned to Clatsop County, 
where .a PUD election came up in May. In a similar election two years 
before, the county had defeated a PUD by nearly a t~ro-to-one vote. Now 
in 1941 the supporters of the PUD had to contend not only with the usual 
citizens' committee but with the impending connection of the Pacific 
Power and Light Company with Bonneville power. On April 25, scarcely 
t~ro weeks before the election, the PP & L announced a reduction in rates 
which was possible because the company would begi.'1 to receive power from 
Bonneville within the next thirty days. The citizens' committee made 
good use of the argument that since Clatsop County could have Bonneville 
power with or without a PUD, voters should wait and see how things -went 
under private management.17 
1
~ugene Register-Guard, May 4, 1941, P• 23. 
17clipping from the Salem Capital Press, May 16., 1941; Salem 
Capital Journal, May 7, 1941, P• 11; M. G. Thorn to PP & L Customers, 
Auril 25, 1941; Pamphlet, Clatsop County Citizens' Committee !:_2 Oupose 
$4,000,000 P.U.D., April 19, 1941. 
,.,,, 
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But the backers of the PUD were neither few nor disorganized. 
In Astoria the Central Labor Council was wholeheartedly behind the PUD 
and reminded the businessmen of Astoria that support of the measure 
would please their many patrons who were members of AFL unions. The 
Grange was actively involved in the campaign, and State Master Gill 
spent the week before the election campaigning in the county. Sweetland 
spent the last ten days before the election rousing the IllA locals which 
were strong in the area. Bonneville field representatives Carl D. 
Thompson and ¥!Orton Tompkins were also present.18 
The campaign, which Sweetland described as ttone of the nastiest 
rough and tumbles I have ever experienced," culminated in the defeat of 
the PUD by less than two hundred votes out of six thousand. The supporters 
of the ?UD interpreted this to mean that sentiment was coming around to 
public power and that they would win if they could arrange another elec-
tion. Sweetland agreed with this interpretation but must have been more 
frustrated than elated with the result. The day following the election 
he wrote to each of the IWA locals in the county reminding them that if 
every member of their local and their wives had been registered to vote, 
their local alone could have made the difference between defeat and 
success. "Speaking for the Commonwealth Federation, I want to say that 
we believe no man or woman is a full fledged union member unless he or 
she is also a registered voter.n19 
18An Open Letter to the Business Men of Astoria from Eli McConkey, 
April 29, 1941; Clipping from the·Salan Capital Press, May 16, 1941; 
Sweetland to Oscar Chapnan, May 8, 1941; Astorian-Budget. May 7, 1941, 
pp. 1, 8. 
19sweetland to Chapnan, May 8, 1941; Astorian-Budget, May 7, 
1941, pp. l, 8; Sweetland to Guy T. Haney, May 7, 1941. 
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In M.arch the OCF had announced with thanksgiving that sufficient 
affiliates of the OCF had ratified the additional tax of twenty-five 
cents per capita to put it into effect. The OCFts financial position 
had improved, but the treasury was still far from well padded. The 
Federation ~ras supposed to pay Sweetland a modest salary for his full-
time service as executive secretary, but payments were highly irregular. 
Time after time Sweetland concluded his report to the board with the 
comment that the executive secretary's salary was several weeks overdue. 
During these years, Wendell Barnett recalls, Sweetland was frequently 
so hard up that · he rummaged the railroad for discarded ties for fuel. 
Mrs. Sweetland worked during some of this period, but her work took 
her to Seattle, Los Angeles, and the East. In 1940 and early in 1941 
Sweetland received several offers of more remunerative positions. But 
he turned them down, although he told Oliver in September that he would 
have to take at least a six months' leave from the CCF to recoup his 
:90rsonal finances, and the separation from his family was growing more 
irksome. By June, 1941, however, he felt the OCF ~ras sufficiently estab-
lished financially and politically for him to leave, and he took a 
position in Washington, D. c., with the Office of Production Management.20 
The executive committee· arranged for Vice-President Ralph Peoples 
to assume the direction of the OCF's activities until the next. convention 
in December, 1941. Throughout the remainder of the year there appears to 
20sweetland to OCF affiliates, March 12, 1941; Minutes of the 
OCF Board of Directors, August 28, 1937; SWeetland to Oliver, Septembe~ 
101 1940; Oregon Labor Press, July 18, 1941, P• 1. 
10.3 
have been little activity by the OCF. It was a slp.ck season politically, 
and Peoples had a full-time job as state CIO secretary. However, on the 
Saturday following· the attack on Pearl Harbor the Commonwealth met in a 
convention which opened with President Stephenson Smith reaffirming the· 
Federation's support of the administration's foreign policy. "Personal 
and partisan politics are adjourned for the duration," Smith told the 
convention. "But the ~conomic and social policies for which ws have 
stood are now more vital t,han ever to keep up national morale." "This 
is a people's war and we must not, when it is over, find that what we 
have been fighting for has disappeared.u21 
At this convention Smith submi~ted his resignation as president of 
the OCF. In the fall of 1939 he had taken a leave of absence from his 
job at the University of Oregon to take a position vdth the American 
Society of Artists, Composers, and Musicians. During 1940, he occa-
sionally returned to Oregon, where he kept his hand in the political 
game, and he served on his travels as a field representative for the 
OCF. Later, however, he resigned his teaching job to move east perman-
ently. In December, 1941, the OCF for the first time needed to find 
new men to fill the two top offices. For president the convention 
selected Douglas Anderson, a former Indiana minister who had gone into 
labor work. Anderson came to Portland in the late thirties as an organ-
izer for the Textile Workers and was considered· by Svreetland to be one 
of the most gifted young men in progressive circles in Oregon. Ralph 
2¾.u.nutes of the OCF Board of Directors, September 7, 1941; 
?1inutes of the fifth annual OCF Convention, December 13, 1941. 
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Peoples was asked by the convention to continue as executive director 
until funds were available to pay a full-time director. To hasten that 
day, the convention raised the per capita tax established by the previous 
convention fr~m twenty-five cents a year to five cents a ~onth per member.22 
The convention, which was smaller than most, was no doubt sub-
dued by the events of the previous weekend. At any rate it produced 
no fireworks and passed only eight resolutions instead of the usual 
twenty to thirty. After the convention, the OCF again showed some life. 
Its office help was engaged in trying to straighten out the records of 
affiliates, urging those that had fallen by the wayside to reaffiliate, 
and attempting to extract payment from affiliates that had neglected 
their dues. With the elections of 1942 approaching, Peoples tried to 
find liberal candidates and to have places of registration established 
near the Portland shipyards. Meetings to endorse candidates were 
organized in Multnomah, Clackamas, Columbia, and Clatsop counties, and 
for the first time in Lane County. The CCF did not put on much of a 
campaign, however. The CIO directed Peoples to give up his work for 
the OCF by April, and no one else was available to do the job. There 
seemed to be a general disinterest in state politics, and the OCF 
found a number of its young male politicians leaving for the service. 
Candidates were hard. to find, and several times the OCF was reduced to 
backing weak candidates in hastily arranged write-in campaigns.23 
22Minutes of the fifth annual OCF Convention, December 13, 1941; 
Portland Oregonian, September 13, 1939, P• 6; Sweetland to Oliver, May 8, 
1941. 
23peoples to Heyman, May 19, 1942; to A. A. Bailey, March 3, 1942; 
Minutes of Special Meeting, Clatsop County, May 6, 1942; Peoples to OCF 
affiliates in Multnomah, Columbia, and Clackamas counties, April 15, 1942; 
Commonwealth People invited to Committee for Endorsements, Lane County, 
n.d.; Minutes of the OCF Executive Board, March l, 1942, and April 12, 1942. 
105 
As the OCFts financial position improved, the board of directors 
began to look for someone to take over as executive director. They were 
now prepared to pay $150 a month for a director and, through Sweetland, 
had arranged for the CIO War Relief Committee to pay $100 a month for the 
director to do part-time work for the CIO. Several possible candidates 
for the job were being considered by the board when the roof caved in on 
the OCF. 24 
On June 6, the Columbia River District Council of the IWA voted 
to disaffiliate from the OCF, apparently because it felt that the IWA 
was getting an inadequate return on its money. The Commonwealth urged 
the Council to reconsider, since the OCF was in the process of finding 
a director who could devote more time to the job, but the Council refused 
to reaffiliate . Several of the IWA locals immediately withdrew, and this 
spelled the end of the OCF. Without their financial support the Common-
wealth could not pay an executive director, and a director was necessary 
to keep the OCF going. Reluctantly the executive board agreed to dis-
continue active operations by the OCF for the duration of the war, 
although they agreed to continue to issue occasional pieces of publi-
city. In 1943 a few very subdued legislative bulletins appeared, and 
with that the Commonwealth Federation faded from the political scene 
in Oregon.25 
24Minutes of the OCF Executive Board, March 1, 1942, and April 
12, 1942. 
25Peoples to Columbia River District IliA locals, June 16, 1942; 
Douglas Anderson to Columbia River District Council, July 8, 1942; W. E. 
Edmiston to OCF, July 20, 1942; Claude Ballard to OCF, June 12, 1942; 
Minutes of the Extraordinary OCF Executive Board, July 26, 1942; Legis-
lative Bulletin No. 1, January 25, 1943, and Sun:mary Legislative Bulle-
tin, March 24, 1943. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
The OCF was one of many organizations that developed during the 
Depression as disturbed citizens saw the need for reform and, in charac-
teristic American fashion, organized to bring it about. The Commonwealth 
Federation was in touch with a number of these organizations, particu-
larly through Sweetland, Smith and Neuberger, all of whom had contacts 
in liberal circles across the county, but its leaders do not appear to 
have modeled the Commonwealth after any particular organization. Although 
they borrowed the OCF's platform from the Washington Commonwealth Federa-
tion, they more often found their neighbor to the north useful as a bad 
example. 
However, the OCF did share some characteristics and problems with 
left-wing political organizations in other states. Most of these organ-
izations, for example, also drew their strength from the groups hit 
hardest by the Depression -- laborers, small farmers, the unemployed, 
and the aged - and from a few leftist intellectuals and professional 
people. They shared the problems of combining radical theories with 
practical politics, of controlling internecine war among different kinds 
of reformers, and of defining attitudes toward the Communist Party. 
The OCF seemed to meet some of these problems more successfully than 
did three comparable movements, the WCF, the Minnesota Farmer-Labor 
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Party, and the supporters of Governor Culbert Olson in California. 
This success is more apparent than real, however, for the OCF never 
faced the test of success as did the left wing in Minnesota, California 
and, to some extent, in Washington. The Oregon group thus avoided many 
of the problems of distributing patronage, of increasing the opportun-
ities for Cowmunist penetration, and of being expected to carry out the 
pledges in its platform.1 
The OCF managed to avoid being taken over by the Communists, 
while its counterpart to the north succumbed. The Communist Party was 
undoubtedly much weaker in Oregon than in Washington, but much of the 
credit for avoiding this pitfall must go to the leaders of the OCF, 
particularly Sweetland. Sweetland, Solomon, Smith, and others at the 
helm were aware of Communist tactics and skilled in meeting them. As 
strong supporters of civil liberties they believed in the right of 
Communists to work freely in a democratic society, although the majority 
of the OCF did not share their belief in 1940. They were confident that 
American society could be reformed and that they could use the Communists 
toward this end without prejudicing the result. They correctly judged 
American democracy, the strength of the Communist Party in Oregon, and 
their own skills. 
The Commonwealth had trouble with divisions among reformers as 
1A number of works have been consulted on left-~ring groups 
during the thirties, · particularly: Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.,~~ 
of Roosevelt (Boston, 1957-60), 3 vols.; Robert E •• Burke, Olson's~ 
Deal for California (Berkeley, 1953);_ George H. Mayer,~ Political 
Career 2f. Floyd£!• Olson (Minneapolis, 1951); and David J. Saposs, 
Communism in American Politics (Washington, 1960). 
I 
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did similar organizations. The AFL cooled to the CCF as it had to 
the WCF; the Socialist Party officially withdrew in the summer of 1938,2 
and the Communists · pulled out of the OCF with a g~eat deal of noise after 
the Nazi-Soviet Pact • .Although the OCF did enlist the support of many · 
pension supporters and did not have the difficulty with the ham-and-eggs 
groups that plagued Olson in California, it never enjoyed the strong 
backing from the advocates of pensions that the WCF developed in the 
Washington Old Age Pension Union.3 Tension existed between farmers 
and laborers in Oregon as elsewhere, but it did not take the form of 
a struggle within the OCF as it did in the Farmer-Labor Party in Minnes-
ota. The absence of this struggle within the OCF is, however, a symptom 
of failure rather than of success, for the OCF did not have enough 
rural support to create the problem. 
The OCF also had difficulty in combining extravagant hopes with 
practical politics. As it matured, however, it seemed gradually and 
smoothly to adjust to the realities of political life in Oregon; the 
OCF suffered no aberrations as did the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party 
in its sudden burst of radicalism in the platform of 1934. The original 
2socialist 9.fil, August 13, 1938, P• 3. The Socialist Party of 
Oregon complained that the OCF was becoming a pressure group in the Demo-
cratic Party and that it was "inconsistent with working class party 
principles to descend to such levels of political opportunism." 
3TM OCF hoped to create a unified pension movement which would 
support the OCF. In pursuit of this goal the Commonweal th tried to 
co-operate with other groups interested in increased pensions in putting 
a common initiative measure on the ballot in 1940. The coalition fell 
apart after several months work, and although the OCF made a preliminary 
filing to put its own pension measure on the bal lot, it became too 
involved in the campaign for Roosevelt to circulate the necessary 
petitions. 
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platform of the Commonwealth Federation was fairly extreme by prevail-
ing political standards in Oregon, and although the OCF never signifi-
cantly changed the platform, it did increasingly ignore it. 
The leaders of the OCF shared the ambiguity of many liberals 
about their role in national politics. In theory most liberals believed 
that they should co-operate, but they were unable to effect a national 
organization of any consequence. As the liberals debated, FDR solved 
their problem by stealing the thunder of the left, and groups like the 
WCF and the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party ended up in or allied with the 
party of the New Deal. The OCF shared the same fate; many of its 
me.~bers had probably belonged to the Democratic Party in sentiment if 
not in fact from the beginning, but when the OCF was organized many of 
its leaders seemed to feel that they were to the left of the national 
Democratic Party and certainly far to the left of the Democratic Party 
in Oregon. 
The original call for a new political organization in Oregon 
at the convention of the State; Federation of Labor in 1934 had been 
for a third party "separate and distinct" from the two regular parties. 
But it seemed impoy~le immediately to wean Republicans, Democrats, 
and Socialists from their traditional party loyalties, and the OCF 
was established as a nonpartisan progressive organization. The OCF 
kept this designation as it moved into the Democratic Party, and its 
leaders, particularly Wendell Barnett and Sweetland, never quite gave 
up hope that a major realignment of political parties would soon occur 
in the United States. Sweetland was not quite sure whether the realign-
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ment would bring a third and liberal party, or would simply polarize 
liberals in the Democratic Party and c9nservatives in the Republican, 
but he intended to be ready for either eventuality. Part of the reason 
Sweetland was so much interested in OCF precinct organization was that 
he wanted to create an independent source of support for the OCF which 
could be swung into the proper camp when the realignment occurred.4 
At the convention in the spring of 1940 Barnett presented a 
resolution calling for the OCF to rim candidates under its own name 
in the first Congressional district in that year. The convention 
referred the resolution to the board of directors for decision. Sweet-
land seemed interested in it both as a means of forcing the major parties 
to run more progressive candidates and as a means of starting to build 
a third party in Oregon which would be ready to go when liberals got 
together nationally. E. L. Oliver shared Sweetland's hope for a realign-
ment of parties but discouraged this venture. The threat of a third 
party, he cautioned Sweetland, would probably be just as effective as 
the fact, and was ce~tainly much less risky. When the OCF was in its 
last throes in the spring of 1942 Wendell Barnett was still eager to 
turn it into a thirrty.5 
The membership of the OCF included persons of various party 
loyalties and reform or protest traditions. Some information is avail-
4sweetland to Harry W. Laidler, December 11, 1937; Sweetland 
to Oliver, October 15, 1938. 
51/iinutes of the OCF Board of Directors, March 3, 1940; Oliver 
to Sweetland, February 19, 1940; Minutes of the OCF Executive Board, 
April 12, 1942. 
-able o~ the more active ma~bers, and it is possible to make a few 
generalizations about the different traditions that they represented. 
The Populist tradition, particularly of opposition to Wall 
Street capitalists and to private monopolies, was probably common to 
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the many members of rural background. Howev~r, it seems to have been 
strongest among the advocates of public power in the Grange and Farmers' 
Union who were suspicious of the OCF and never achieved more than a W-dry 
truce with it. Many of these farmers felt antipathy toward labor organ-
izations, for foreigners, and occasionally for religious minorities. 
Obviously the OCF would not be a comfortable political home for persons 
of this persuasion, although 'tlalyer Pierce, who perhaps belonged to 
this tradition, managed to work fa.th the Common~realth. 
The Progressive tradition is also hard to isolate in the OCF. 
Its presence was possibly revealed by the OCF's concern with clean and 
democratic government; the Federation supported reform in state insti-
tutions, the registration of lobbyists, higher pay for legislators, 
and, of course, the direct primary. But in so far as these concerns 
may have reflected the Progressive tradition, all OCF members seemed 
to share them to about the same degree. The constant reference by the 
OCF. to its members and friends as "progressives" also suggests that 
the Progressive tradition was widely diffused. 
Marxists of various shades were represented in the Commonwealth 
Federation, and the small Communist group has already been discussed. 
During the first year of the OCF, members of this faction appeared to 
have quite a bit of influence on the OCF's publications. The ideas of 
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class conflict and working-class solidarity were pertinent in the 
bitter days of 1937 and 1938 and were shared by non-Communists. How-
ever,'after the warfare in labor lessened and General Martin was 
defeated, the literature also bec~~e more subdued, and it is impossible 
to tell how much credence non-Communists in the working class gave to 
V.iarxist doctrines. 
The Socialist group shared the Communists' interest in the work-
ing class, although few of the Socialists in the OCF were "workers." 
Most of them were college students and professional people, housewives 
and farmers. It is difficult to tell how many Socialists were members 
of the Commonwealth. Representatives of Socialist organizations never 
numbered more than ten at a conventi~n, but some of the representatives 
of other organizations were Socialists. Whatever their number, they 
plr yed an important part in the OCF both because they were politically 
experienced and because the executive secretary of the OCF was a 
Socialist. The Socialist Party formally withdrew from the Commonwealth 
Federation in the summer of 1938, but many individual Socialists remained 
in the OCF. Although Sweetland's relations with the party's leaders in 
Oregon were strained, he r~~ained on good terms with Norman ThOlJ).as. 
Many of the Socialists in the OCF, including Sweetland, seem 
to have drawn their Socialism as much from the Social Gospel as from 
Y.arx. Sweetland was an active Methodist, one of the young representa-
tives from the Socialist club in Eugene was a Methodist minister, and 
several of the other Socialists moved in the same liberal Methodist 
circles. The OCF also drew support from some liberal Congregationalists, 
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and ministers, former ministers, and the sons of ministers were repre-
sented in the Commonwealth out of all .proportion to their numbers in 
the general population. 
The greatest single source \strength for the OCF was the CIO, 
particularly the IWA. It is impossible to tell how much the anti-
Communists here thought or·cared about Marxist ideas. They were, of 
course, advocates of vigorous unionism and interested in political 
action to achieve labor's rights. Interest in political action occa-
sionally lagged, but not for long. For instance, Max Gardner was 
sufficiently discouraged following the general election of 1938 to 
suggest that labor should stick to its "first job," educating the 
worker "along the lines of economic union activities."6 However, 
when Gardner was organizing CIO unions in Lane County in 1941 he 
encouraged the new unionists to wor.k with the OCF. The withdrawal from 
·the OCF of the Columbia River District Council of the IWA did not mean 
that the woodworkers were abandoning political action, but simply that 
they intended to pursue it through different channels. 
It seems probable that the CIO, and especially the IWA, ·included 
a number of former Wobblies, but if so, the Wobbly influence is not 
discernible in the OCF. The writer has been able to identify only 
three former Wobblies among the active members of the Federation.apart 
from Dr. Marie Equi, who had been associated with the Wobblies and who 
supported the OCF financially. 
6Gardner to Sweetland, January 2, 1939. 
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Most of the OCF's officers were keenly interested in civil 
liberties, and the OCF drew a number of liberal lawyers who did a great 
deal of quiet work on cases that came to the attention of the Common-
wealth Federation • . The Portland chapter of the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People was affiliated with the OCF, at 
least in 1937, but neither racial nor religious minority groups provided 
major sources of support for the OCF, primarily because minorities were 
not very numerous in Oregon. 
The OCF also drew people with a panacea for the problems of the 
Depress7on. A few Technocrats attended the first convention and a 
number of Townsendites were active in the OCF. The Commonwealth had 
not endorsed the Plan, but by the late thirties, some of the Town-
sendites were willing to work with those interested in less extrava-
gant pension programs. 
The Democratic Party was growing tremendously in Oregon during 
the life of the OCF. The population was also growing, but the absolute 
decline in the registration of the Republican and Socialist parties 
indicates that much of the Democratic strength came from persons who 
were changing their affiliations. The realignment that Sweetland hoped 
for was taking place, although in a much less decisive way than he had 
expected. The Commonwealth Federation serv~d as a halfway house for 
many changing their party identification. For instance, Dave Epps, 
Roy Hewitt, and Harry Kenin all changed their registr ation from Repub-
lican to Democratic during these years, and Sweetland left the Social -
ist Party to become a Democrat. Many people would have made the transi-
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tion to the Democratic Party without the aid of the Commonwealth, but 
for others it provided encouragement and an occasion for changing. The 
Republican in Woodburn who had voted for Roosevelt, but did not change 
his registration until there was some immediate reason for doing so --
a census job - was probably not unique.7 
Considering the popularity of Roosevelt, the growing Democratic 
registration in Oregon and the enthusiasm for public power in many 
sections of the population, it is surprising that the CCF did not 
achieve greater electoral success than it did. There was never a 
clear-cut test of the strength of the OCF's following and it is impos-
sible ti make more than a rough guess of the number of votes it could 
influence. From a study of the results of the general election in 
1938, Sweetland concluded that the OCF could swing 4 to 6 per cent of 
the normal Democratic vote to Republican candidates endorsed by the 
Federation. However, his calculations were based only on the 117 
precincts in Portland where the OCF had done door-to-door campaigPing 
and most of these precincts were in working-class areas.8 The Common-
wealth Federation could never influence more than a small percentage of 
the Democratic vote in northwestern Oregon, although.this was enough to 
make the difference in some elections. 
?Rodney Alden to Sweetland, October 9, 1939. 
8uconfidential Report on Effect of CCF Endorsment[E£] in 1938 
Election". Sweetland himself had no clear idea of the size of the CCF's 
membership, which he estimated to be between 22,000 and 50,000 in 1939. 
It is unlikely that it was ever as high as the lowest figure. 
Perhaps one reason for the OCF's relatively poor sho~ring was 
that it was a late bloomer compared to many Depression-inspired left-
wing groups. It did not get under way until the middle of 1937, and 
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by that time New Deal measures had begun to take effect and it. no longer 
seemed necessary to join a radical organization to achieve reform. The 
OCF was also born at the same time that warfare in labor rocked Oregon, 
a.nd as a left-wing organization it was inevitably .and unfavorably asso-
ciated in the public mind with the violence of that period. The CCF 
.had just four years to get established before the Second World War 
diverted attention and energy from domestic reform, and domestic reform 
was the Commonwealth's stock in trade. 
The Commonwealth might have been able to struggle through the 
war years if it had had sufficient funds to employ a full-time director. 
The inadequate financing of the organization appea.rs to this writer to 
have been one of the major reasons why it did not make a better show-
ing in elections, as well as why it collapsed. Without substantial 
outside help the financial problem was almost insuperable. The large 
majority of the OCF's supporters ·were persons of little or no income: 
small farmers, the unemployed, the aged, workers frequently on strike, 
students and young professional people. Their poverty meant more than 
that they could not contribute enough to pay for much radio time or 
many newspaper advertisements. It meant that the executive secretary 
had to spend valuable time reassuring creditors, that travel was 
limited, and that money for postage was inadequate. The CCF had no 
trouble enlisting volunteer workers, but even eager volunteers need 
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their enthusiasm stoked by an occasional convention. The financial 
condition of the OCF forced it to eliminate one of its semiannual con-
ventions, and the financial condition of the membership meant that 
members from f~her away than Astoria or Eugene rarely attended con-
ventions. Those in Coquille or Klamath Falls simply couldn't afford 
the trip, nor could their organizations afford to send them. 
The radical tone of its platform and literature was another 
reason for the weakness of the OCF with the electorate. Many Oregon-
ians were prepared for public o~mership of hydroelectric resources, 
but they were not prepared for the "[p]ublic ownership of all natural 
resources, utilities, banks, and monopolies.rr9 Nor were they -prepared 
for free medical care for all school children or for the application 
of the principle of production for use. As it turned out, the CCF 
was not particularly committed to some parts of its platform, but the 
platforn, combined with the Commonwealth's alliance with the CIO and 
the presence of a few Communists in the membership, made the organiza-
tion appear to be much more extreme than it actually was. 
The youthfulness of many of the leaders of the CCF may explain 
the radical tone of the OCF. Of the twenty-seven members of the board 
of directors in 1939, eight were twenty-five or younger, and another 
seven or eight were under thirty-five.10 This did not necessarily mean 
that they were politically inexperienced; for instance, one of the 
9p1atfonn of the CCF. 
lOsweetland to Richard R. Brown, May 27, 1939. 
' 
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young members of the board had become an organizer for the Socialist 
Party at the age of sixteen. But it did make it easier to dismiss the 
OCF with slighting references to the "infant Sweetland" than would have 
been possible if the OCF had been led by a score of middle- aged and well-
established gentlemen. The youthfulness of many members of the Common-
wealth also made them less effective candidates for public office. 
The youth of the OCF and of its membership, its inadequate finan-
cing and radical platform, combined ~rith the Republican tradition in 
Oregon, the strong grip of the old guard on the Democratic Party, and 
the turmoil in labor, were too much for the Commonwealth Federation to 
overcome in the short time allotted it before the war. However, the 
measure of the organization is not to be taken entirely in terms of 
its immediate success ~Tith the electorate. 
The OCF was an educational as well as a political venture, and 
it provided training for some of Oregon's future leading Democratic 
figures. After the war, Sweetland returned to Oregon and was the 
force behind a precinct-by-precinct rehabilitation of the Democratic 
Party. In 1948 he was elected Democratic national committeeman; Dave 
Epps became chairman of the state Democratic Central Committee for a 
short time before his death in 1959; and Ralph Peoples made a respec-
table showing as the Democratic nominee for Labor Commissioner in 1946. 
Gus Solomon became a federal judge and Ri chard L. Neuberger a United 
States Senator. 
The Commonwealth Federation helped trai n the al ert and politi-
cally- conscious citizens who, though they may never hold publ ic office, 
119 
are the bQckbone on which democracy depends. At a time when democracy 
was being tested around the world Roy Hewitt· challenged the members of 
the OCF at its first convention. 
If we fail to possess our social inheritance ••• what 
excuse can we offer to posterity? Can we say we did not 
know what was takiP.g place until it was too late? That 
is not trueo. We do know. • • • Can we admit we knew 
what was taking place but that we did not have the means 
to prevent the disaster? That is not true, either. We 
have in form, given to us by·the fathers to protect our 
inheritance, a government of, by and for the people; we 
still have the ballot. If we fail, we must admit that 
we lacked the courage, the intelligence and the neces-
sary give and take to act together in time •••• We 
will save our social inheritance for·ourselves and 
posterity •••• If we do not do it, it will not be 
done.11 
This sense of the personal responsibility of every citizen for 
the fate of his country was the most characteristic trait of the Oregon 
Commonwealth Federation and its most constructive ·contribution to the 
political life of Oregon. 
llKeynote Address by Hewitt. 
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APPENDIX A 
PROGRAM OF THE OREGON COMi'10NWEALTH FEDERATION 
Prea.111ble 
It is evident that our natural resources and highly developed 
productive power make abundance possible and poverty no longer necessary. 
Yet organized special privilege threatens to destroy democratic institu-
tions, abrogate civil liberties, keep the common people in permanent 
poverty and incite wars for profit -- unless all progressives organize 
to defend their democratic institutions, protect their civil liberties, 
advance the common security, and defeat the plans of the war-makers. 
For this purpose we ask all workers, farmers and progressives to unite 
on the following minimum program: 
Platform 
1. Public ownersnip of all natural resources, utilities, banks, 
and mono_polies. Bonneville power made available to the people of Oregon 
by publicly construct ed . trana~ission lines, and by a blanket rate to 
public distributing agencies; endorsement and support of the creation 
of peoplest utility districts. 
2. Security of tenure for farmers from eviction by mortgage 
foreclosure; public refinancing at a low interest rate; subsidizing 
of cooperative agricultural enterprises such as cooperative warehouses 
and canneries; encouragement of consumer and producer cooperatives. 
Encouragement and fostering of the organization of farmers into econo-
mic e.nd political units, to the end that they may secure a measure of 
control over the marketing of their products through collective bar-
gaining and thereby obtain cost of production; abolition of deficiency 
judgments in mortgage foreclosures. 
3. Full protection of civil liberties to preserve our da~o-
cratic rights; defense of the right of workers, a~ployed and unemployed, 
to join unions of their own choosing, bargain collectively, and to strike 
and picket without interference from local, state or national authorities; 
full support of the campaign against lynching, and for the civil rights 
of Negroes and other racial minorities; against any infringments of 
civil rights for civil servants and public employees, local, state 
and national. 
4. A union standard of wages for all those in private or 
public a~ployment, legislation for minimum hours, and the complete 
abolition of the exploitation of children for profit. 
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5. A moratorium of two years on home owners' loans in cases 
where the borrower is unable to :r.1eet the terms of the contract; a mora-
torium of two years on all mortgages and taxes on homes and farms of 
$2000 or less; public slum clearance and low-cost housing projects to 
provide homes for those inadequately housed. 
6. Enactment of a law providing for the testing upon request 
of all consu~er goods by a state bureau of standards, and investiga-
tion of conditions of labor under which they are made, and general 
publication of the findings. 
?. Immediate enactment of legislation by the state or nation 
which will afford pensions sufficient to sustain the aged and others 
ineligible for employment in comfort and security. 
8. Useful public works to re-employ all unemployed at union 
wages, and when such work is not available, complete unemployment insur-
ance for all jobless workers equivalent to the prevailing wage. 
9. Extension of the public health service to provide hospi-
talization and medical and dental treatment free to all school children, 
and all families whose annual income is less than $1500 a year. 
10. 118.intenance of peace in America by the nationalizing of 
war industries to take the profit out of war, and the establishment 
of world peace by an embargo on all war materials, and on all raw 
materials used for war purposes to fascist aggressor nations and by 
cooperation with all democratic peoples for the defense of inter-
national democracy and peace. 
11. Complete acad~~ic freedom both in class and out for stu-
dents and teachers, guaranteeing that neither will be dismissed without 
a hearing; adequate salaries and retirement provisions for all teachers; 
democratic representation of labor and other groups on boards control-
ling all educational institutions; and abolition of tuition fees for 
students, with government help to needy students based on a living 
wage. We advocate complete demilitarization of the campus. 
12. Exemption of $2000 of the total actual value of any home, 
farm or residential building from property taxation, providing the owner 
is th~ occupant; taxation systa~ based on ability to pay, with graduated 
taxes on high incomes, gifts, inheritances, corporation surpluses, 
intangibles, and public bonds now exempt, and the reassessment and 
reclassification of all property to eliminate the tax dodger and equal-
ize taxes; reaffirmation of our opposition to general sales tax. 
13. Adoption of a one-house legislature in order that the demands 
of the people may be more accurately reflected and quickly met,legisla-
tors to be paid a yearly salary. 
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14. Constitutional ar~endment to prohibit the Supreme Courts 
of the state or nation from exercising their usurped powers to .nullify 
popul~r legislation by declaring it unconstitutional. 
(Adopted April 24-25, 1937) 
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APPENDIX B 
PROGRAM OF THE W!tSHINGTON COMMONWEALTH FEDERATION 
Preamble 
It is evident that our natural resources and highly developed 
productive power make _abundance possible and poverty no longer neces-
sary. Yet organized special privilege threatens to destroy democratic 
institutions, abrogate civil liberties, keep the common people in per-
manent poverty and incite wars for profit -- unless all progressives 
organize to defend their democratic institutions, protect their civil 
liberties, advan~e the common security, and defeat the plans of the 
war rr:akers. For this prime purpose we ask all workers, farmers, and 
progressives to unite on the following mL.~imu.T. program: 
Platform 
1. Public ownership of all natural resources, public utili-
ties, banks and monopolies. 
2. Full protection of civil liberties to preserve our demo-
cratic rights and to ward off the threat of fascism. 
3. Enactment of laws to protect workers in their rights to 
join unions of .their ovm choosing and to strike and picket, without 
interference from the police power of the city, state, or federal 
goverTh~ents or from court injunctions; the outlawing of company unions, 
and the rescinding of such laws as the Criminal Syndicalism Act which 
interfere with the rights of labor. 
4. A union standard of wages for all those in private or 
public employment, legislation for minimum wages and maximum hours, 
and the complete abolition of child labor. 
5. Security of tenure for farmers from eviction by mortgage 
foreclosures and the guarantee of maximum returns to the farmers by 
the subsidizing of cooperative vrarehousing, ·canning and farming enter-
prises. 
6. Exemption of $2000 of the total value of any home, farm · 
or residential building from property taxation, providing the owner 
is 'the occupant; a moratorium of 50 years on Home Owners' Loans in 
cases where the borrower is unable to meet the terms of the contract; 
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a moratorium of two years on all mortgages and taxes on homes and farms 
of $2000 or less; and public slum clearance and low-cost housing pro-
jects to provide homes for those inadequately housed. 
7. Enactment of a law providing for the testing upon request 
of all consumer goods by a state bureau of standards·, and investigation 
of conditions of labor under which they are made, and general publica-
tion of the findings. 
8. Immediate enactment of any legislation by the state and 
nation which will afford adequate pensions for the aged and all others 
ineligible for employment. 
9. Useful public works to re-employ all unemployed at union 
wages. and when such work is not available, complete unemployment 
insurance for all jobless workers eqU:Lvalent to the prevailing wage. 
10. Extension of the public health service to provide hospital-
ization and medical and dental treatment free to all school children, 
and all families whose annual income is less than $1500 a year. 
11. Haintenance of peace in America by the nationalizing of 
war industries to take the profit out of war, and the establishment 
of world peace by an embargo on all war materials, and on all raw 
materials used for war purposes to fascist aggressor nations and by 
cooperation 1--:ith all democratic nations for the defense of interna-
tional democracy. 
120 Complete acadenic freedom guaranteeing that no teacher 
will be dismissed without a hearing; adequate salaries and retirement 
provisions for all teachers; democratic representation of labor and 
other groups on boards controlling all state educational institutions; 
and abolition of tuition fees for students, with government help to 
needy students based on a living wage. 
13. Taxation system based on ability to pay, with graduated 
taxes on high incomes, gifts, inheritances, corporation surpluses, 
intangibles, and public bonds now exempt, and the reassessment and 
reclassification of all property to eliminate the tax dodger and equal-
ize taxes, by these means to make possible the abolition of the sales 
tax. 
14. Adoption of a one-house legislature in order that the 
demands of the people may be more accurately reflected and quickly met, 
legislators to be paid a yearly salary. 
150 Constitutional amendment to prohibit the Supreme Courts 
of the state or nation from exercising their usurped powers to nullify 
_popular legislation by declarir'.g it unconstitutional. 
(Adopted November 14-15, 1936) 
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